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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this research is to investigate the gram-
matical structure of primary-process thinking as expressed 
in speech under a special condition of weakened ego con-
trols. The study is formulated within the framework of 
psychoanalytic theory and is specifically based on Freud's 
writings on cognition and Rapaport's elaborations of them. 
The means employed for inducing weakened ego controls is 
alcohol intoxication. 
Freudian psychology differentiates between two types 
of thinking: primary-process thinking, called ideation, 
and secondary-process thinking, called thought. Ideation 
is characterized as an hallucinatory wish-fulfillment which 
arises when instinctual needs are not gratified by immediate 
discharge of cathexis through motility. This type of think-
ing is conceptualized as being illogical, irrational, and 
unrealistic. Secondary-process thinking is described as 
being rational, logical, and realistic; in it, a delaying 
and detouring of drive on its path to discharge is accom-
plished. Genetically, ideation is considered to be the pro-
totype of all thought, secondary-process thinking emerging 
in the course of development. The establishment of secondary-
1 
2. 
proces_s thinking does not eliminate the existence of 
primiti-ve modes of thinking and functioning. There is no 
sharp demarcation between these two processes; rather, 
there is a continuous transition from the primitive 
pleasure-oriented to the mature reality-oriented modes of 
thinking and functioning. Ps7chosis and dreams reveal the 
existence of the primary processes, and alcohol intoxica-
tion, by weakening the ego controls and defenses, tends to 
create a similar state of affairs. 
Before Freud, such an approach to thought processes 
had not been undertaken. By demonstrating the motivation 
of thought and by differentiating between the primary and 
secondary modes of thinking, Freud made one of his greatest 
contributions to ps7cbolog7, and aroused interest in both 
the formal characteristics and the contents of these pro-
cesses. With the shifting of emphasis in ps7choanalysis 
from the id to the ego, a more detailed study of ordered 
secondary-process thinking became necessary. Rapaport 
presented to psychologists and anal7sts a clear for.mulation 
and elaboration of Freud's original writings on cognition. 
Since Freud's contribution, many attempts have been 
made to study the content of ideation as well as its formal 
characteristics. Although both Freud and Rapaport refer to 
grammatical peculiarities of primary-process thinking, up to 
now no research has investigated hypotheses about grammatical 
J. 
structure generated from tbe psychoanalytic theory of the 
primary process and applied to speech 1n a state of weak-
ened ego functioning. The aim of this research is to in-
vestigate this area within the framework of the psycho-
analytic theory or thinking. 
Outside of the realm or psychoanalytic theory, however, 
the grammatical analysis of language has been of interest 
to many workers. A rich literature exists on various aspects 
or grammar: individuality of literary style, the relation-
ship of voice to temperament, the development of language 
in children, the understanding of personality characteris-
tics through grammatical analysis of speech, and linguistic 
changes in cases of psychopathology. Particularly the last 
of these indicates a relationship between certain grammatical 
forms and certain clinical s,mptoms and disorders. The 
change of grammar in states of mental pathology which, in 
psychoanalytic theory, are assumed to be states of re-
gression to more primitive modes or thinking, furnish some 
evidence that the grammatical structure of speech dominated 
by the primary processes may be different from speech 
dominated by the secondary processes. 
The presentation of the theoretical background of this 
research, therefore, will have to deal with three separate 
sets of formulations. First, a detailed explanation of the 
psychoanalytic theory of cognition will be ~resented. This 
4. 
will be followed by a summary of a variety of studies on 
grammatical structure. Finally, the two areas will be 
integrated into a hypothetical for.mulation about the 
nature of the grammatical structure of speech 1n states 
where the primary processes may be more dominant, and the 
operational applications of these theoretical formulations 
will be presented. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEDRY OF THINKING 
Freud conceptualized a primitive psychic apparatus 
as one "whose work is regulated by the efforts to avoid 
accumulation of excitement and as far as possible to main-
1 tain itself free from excitement." The aim of the psy-
chic apparatus is thus to maintain an equilibrium in its 
energ7 distribution. A disturbance of this equilibrium is 
experienced as painful and is therefore avoided, and the 
re-establishment of the equilibrium is experienced as 
pleasurable and is therefore sought. The primitive psychic 
a~paratus attempts to accomplish this aim by immediate dis-
charge of its cathexis through motility and thus serves 
the Pleasure Principle. 
Immediate discharge of cathexis is possible only if 
the object that gratifies the drive is present and if 
there are no structures inhibiting the free flow of cathexes.2,3 
1 s. Freud. The interpretation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955~ p. 59e. 
2 H. Hartmann. Ego psychology and the problem of 
adaptation. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and patholofa 
o'f thouaht. New .York: Col'Ull1bia Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 362-
396. 
3 R. R. Holt. A critical examination of Freud's con-
cept o'f bound vs. mobile cathexis. Personal communication, 
1959. 
5 
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If such is the case, the drive is satisfied by action on 
this object and the disequilibrium is abolished. An ex-
ample of this would be the feeling or hunger experienced 
by the infant and the gratification of this need by suck-
ing the breast or the mother. However, it can happen that 
the drive tension increases to the point of discharge but 
the need-satisfying object is absent, causing a delay of 
discharge. This delay has two main effects on the psychic 
apparatus. One of these, the observed effect, is con-
ceptualized as affect discharse. Affect discharge is dif-
fuse and is made either into motor activity or secretory 
systems. It manifests itself in behavior as generalized, 
undifferentiated, aimless restlessness.4' 5 
The second effect of the delay of discharge is not 
observable and is reconstructed. When the drive tension 
mounts and the object which in the past gratified this 
drive is absent, an hallucinatory image of the object and/or 
of the previous experience or gratification emerges and dis-
charge is made into this image. Freud conceptualized this 
4 s. Freud. Formulation on two principles of mental 
functioning. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Or~anization and 
tathologz of thought. New York: Coiuili'6ta Uii!v. Press, 
951, pp. Ji5-J28. 
as ideation and considered it the prototype of all 
tbought. 6' 7, 8 
7. 
Once a link is established between the drive and the 
hallucinatory image of the object which in the past grati-
fied this drive, whenever the tension increases the primi-
tive psychic apparatus aims to recathect this image. 11 An 
-
impulse of this kind is what we call a wish; the re-
appearance of the perception is the fulfillment of the 
wish, and the shortest path to the fulfillment of the wish 
is a path leading direct from the excitation produced by 
the need to a complete cathexis of the perception •••• Thus 
the aim of this first ps,-chical activity was to produce a 
'perceptual identity' - a repetition of the perception 
which was linked with the satisfaction of the need.n9 
The emergence of the hallucinatory image in conscious-
ness indicates that the tension arising from the instinctual 
6 s. Freud. Formulation on two principles of mental 
functioning. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and 
tatholosz of tholr.iht. New York: Columbia trn!v. Press, 951, pp. 315-Ja:: 
7 s. Freud. The unconscious. In Co~lected Papers, 
Vol. IV, New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 98-1)6. 
ing. 
anal 
9 s. Freud. The interpretation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955, P• 566. 
8. 
drive has mounted to the point at which it is seeking dis-
charge. Thus ideation and affect are considered to be in-
dicators and safety valves of drive tension. This is why 
in Freudian psychology both are called drive representations. 
The for.mer is referred to as the qualitative and the latter 
as the quantitative aspect of the drive representation.10 
Both, however, dispose of small amounts of cathexis. Hal-
lucinatory wish-fulfillment (ideation) is an abortive effort 
at instinctual discharge, and fails to bring about the 
gratification that would be attained from full discharge 
by obtaining the object. Therefore, a continuous attempt 
at hallucination leads to expenditure of cathexis without 
adequate satisfaction of the drive. Hallucinatory psychosis 
is a good example of such an attempt, where the energy is 
consumed by hallucinatory wish-fulfillment - a condition 
which leads to exhaustion and in some cases, to death.11 
Ideation arises when the drive tension increases but 
cannot be discharged. This implies a delay of discharge, an 
important consequence of which is that the experiences 
Rapaport. 
, 
9. 
preceding, ~ollowing, or occurring around the gratification 
accumulate in the ~or.m o~ memory traces. It is the memory 
trace o~ the need-satis~ying object which is invested with 
cathexis in the delay o~ discharge, and its appearance in 
hallucinatory form in consciousness indicates that the 
memory is charged with instinctual energy. In Freudian 
psychology such a memory is conceptualized as drive-
12 13 
organized. ' 
Within the drive organization o~ memory, the emergence 
o~ the hallucinatory image is dependent on the increase o~ 
the drive tension. In such a system, all memories have 
equal gratification value, and thus a memory o~ anything 
that occurred prece ding, following or around the experi-
ence of gratification can represent the drive tension. 
The same is true of a memory of any part of an experience 
related to the situation of gratification. Contradictory 
memories do not eliminate one another, but remain side by 
side and can unite to produce a hallucinatory consciousness 
12~s. Freud. For.mulations on two principles of mental 
functioning. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and 
tathologz of tho~ht. New York: Columbia Univ. -Press, 
951, pp. 315-3~ 
13 D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and~athology of 
thought. New York: Columbia univ. Press, l $1, pp. 689-
736. 
10. 
as if no contradiction existed.14, 15 
The appearance of the hallucinatory image of the ob-
ject and/or of the experience of gratirication is possible 
only because or the mobile character or the drive energy, 
conceptualized as mobility of cathexis. Mobile cathexis 
obeys the pleasure principle in that it strives ror direct 
discharge. It is the mobility or cathexis which enables 
energy to be freely shifted from one drive representation 
to another, facilitating interchangeability among memory 
traces, conceptualized as displac~ent. Since the energy 
in such a system is so easily transrerable, an intermediate 
presentation may be invested with energy, conceptualized as 
compromise rormation. The intensities of individual memories 
may be concentrated 1n a single idea, conceptualized as 
condensation. "The ideas which transfer their intensities 
to each other stand in the loosest mutual relations. They 
are linked by associations of a kind that is scorned by our 
normal think1ng.ul6 As a whole, such processes, which 
14 s. Freud.. The intelj?retation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955. 
l6 s. Freud. The interpretation or dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955, p. 596. 
11. 
employ mobile cathexes and ultimately se~ve the pleasure 
p~inciple, ~e conceptualized as sy.nc~etie mechanisms of 
prtmary-p~ocess thinking.l7, 18 
Developmental psychology has pointed out that the o~i­
ginal experience of the need-satisfying object is a diffuse, 
undifferentiated one, in which visual, acoustic, tactile and 
other stimulations ~e fused. The need-s~tisfying object 
is not differentiated from the context in which it appears, 
nor from the experiences immediatel7 p~ece ding or follow-
ing it. No disc~ete objects exist, and when the need ten-
sion increases, it is this diffuse, global image of the ob-
ject o~ experience ot gratification which emerges in con-
sciousness.19 
In the course of development, drive cathexis begins to 
differentiate into partial drives and drive derivatives. 
Togethe~ with the accumulation of mnemic images and the dif-
ferentiation of drives into their derivatives, a great num-
be~ of images accumulate a~ound a single drive or drive 
11 E: von Doma.ru.s. The specific laws of logic in 
schizophrenia. In J. s. Kasanin (Ed.), L3uage and 
thlUf:ht in schizophrenia. Berkeley: Un~ot dalir. Press, 
19 , pp. !04-114: -
l8 H. w_ erner. A comn~ative tsffichology of mental 
development. New York: . arper~, 9 o. 
19 D. Rapapo~t, (Ed.) O~anization and ;atholog~ of 
thought. New York: Columbia n!v. Press, 19 1, pp. CJ9-7JO. 
12. 
derivative, so that one drive comes to be represented by 
several ideas and one idea comes to represent several drives 
or partial drives. This implies that the diffuse image has 
differentiated into discrete objects and experiences. Once 
this developmental stage is reached, cathectic displacements 
and ideational connections take place not only among the 
representations of a single drive, but also between those 
of two or more drives. In order to attain consciousness, 
ideas are no longer dependent on the cathexis of one drive 
and sim.ilarly, cme drive is not bound to a single idea to be 
discharged. Thus we find a multitude of instinct representa-
tions which are mutually interchangeable because they gain 
tbeir meaning only from being the representations of the 
same instinctual drive. This is also why displacements, 
condensations, and compromise for.mations are possible in 
primary-process think1ng.20 
In this tJPe of thinking, the quantitative (affective) 
and the qualitative (ideational) aspects of the drive repre-
sentation are fused and are indivisible. It is only in the 
later stages of development~ when controlling counter-
cathectic energy distributions are established, that the 
differentiation of ideation from affect takes place and 
thought gains its relative freedom from affect. 
2o ~., PP· 689-7JO. 
••• Thinking must concern itsel~ with the 
connecting paths between ideas, without 
being led astray by the intensities o~ 
those ideas. But it is obvious that con-
densations o~ ideas, as wellas intermedi-
ate and compromise structures, must ob-
struct the attainment o~ the identity 
aimed at. Since they substitute one idea 
~or another, they cause a deviation ~rom 
the path which would have led on ~rom the 
~irst idea. Processes o~ this kind are 
there~ore scrupulously avoided in secondary 
thinking. It is easy to see, too, that the 
unpleasure principle, which in other re-
spects supplies the thought-process with its 
most important signposts, puts di~~iculties 
in its path towards establishing 1 thought 
identity.' Accordingly, thinking must aim 
at ~reeing itsel~ more and more from ex-
clusive regulation by the unpleasure prin-
ciple and at restricting the development of 
affect in thought-activity to the minimum 
required for acting .as a signal. The 
achievement of this greater delicacy in 
~unctioning is aimed at by means of a fur-
ther hyper-cathexis, brought about by 
consciousness.21 
13 • 
The precondition for ideation is that cathexis be with-
drawn ~rom the outside world and those parts of the mind 
which are oriented to external reality be ~unctionally 1m-
mobilized.22 This implies a state in which reality is ig-
nored or not perceived by the individual, the best examples 
being dream phenomena, ps,-chosis, neurosis and infancy. In 
2! F d T s •. reu • he inte;retation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955, pp. 6o~- 3· -
22 c. Rycro~t. Sy.mbolism and its relationship to the 
primary and secondary processes. Int. J. Pszchoanat., 1956, 
:rJ_, pp. 137-146. 
sleep, hallucinatory wish-fulfillment becomes possible by 
the reduction in the forces of censorship employed by the 
ego over the unconscious wishes as well as by the cessa-
tion of sensory stimulation from the environment. 23 In psy-
chosis, regression to the earlier forms of thinking is 
facilitated by the weakening of the ego and defensive 
denial of reality. In neurosis, a partial withdrawal from 
reality is accompanied by an increase in phantasy life 
based on p8)a~al elaboration of infantile memories. In-
fancy, a special case of this phenomenon, facilitates hal-
lucinatory wish-fulfilL~ent because of the absence and/or 
immaturity of the ego. 
It is the lack of differentiation of the ego which is 
responsible for the egocentricity of ideation, best demon-
strated in children's thinking. Not having yet acquired a 
sense of an external reality and being unaware of his own 
identity, the child tends to confuse his "self" (his "I") 
with the world, what is subjective with the objective, the 
internal with the external, the thought with the event. 
Assimilating the world into his self and his self into the 
world, the child confuses his own body, his own needs and 
desires with the objects and events of external reality. 
23 L. Goldberger and R. R. Holt. Experimental inter-
ferance with reality contact: Individual differences. 
Paper read at Harvard symposium, Boston, June, 1958. 
15. 
Thus he projects onto reality the contents of his own con-
sciousness, perceiving the world of events from his own 
subjective point of view alone. Such a tendency to inter-
pret the events of reality in terms of one's own needs is 
conceptualized as esocentriciY1.24 
Such egocentric thOught lacks spatial, temporal, causal 
relationships.25 It is not concerned with the "how" of 
events because the emphasis is on the objects which satisfy 
the drive and/or on the experience of gratification. Thus 
such thought processes lack coherence, organization, and 
integration, and are fragmented. 
The lack of differentiation of the ego is also responsible 
for the idiosyncratic character of ideation: The modes of 
representation of primary-process thinking are unique to the 
individual. Being syntonic only with the drives of the in-
fant, ideation does not communicate except through syncretic 
mechanisms (see above) and is therefore conceptualized as 
autistic and asocial. It is only through the differentiation 
of the ego that· the idiosyncratic, autistic, and asocial 
character of ideation develops into socialized, ordered, 
communicable thought. 
24 This conception of egocentricity is derived from 
Piaget. J. Piaget. Judgement and reasoning in the child. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace,. 19~8. 
25 J. Piaget. The lan~ije and thought of the child. 
2nd ed. London: Routledge~j2. 
16. 
As was pointed out above, the psychoanalytic theory of 
cognition asserts that the first social relations are with 
the drive objects. When reality necessitates the giving up 
of these objects, intrapsychically their memory trace, in-
stead of their perception, starts to be cathected. This 
process is conceptualized as introjection. These intro-
jected objects become suborganizations within the ego and 
such organizations are conceptualized as identifications. 
The integration of the introjected objects and the loss of 
their independence give rise to a homogeneous ego, as well 
as to the ego ideal and the superego. Thus the child is 
able to take over the feelings, reactions and thoughts of 
others, i.e., becomes capable of sociall7 shared thinking 
that can be communicated.26 
With the differentiation of the ego from the outside 
world and the gradual awareness of one's own separate iden-
tity, the motivations of behavior and thought change in 
character. They are no longer directly triggered by the 
instinctual needs; on the contrary, they gain functional, 
although relative, autonomy from their drive origin,27 and 
" 26 D. Rapaport. Organization and patholos; of tho~ht. 
New York: Columbia Urilv. Press, 1951, pp. 689- JO. 
27 Hartmann, as well as Rapaport, assumes that the ego 
and the id both arise by differentiation from a common undif-
ferentiated matrix in which the ego's inborn apparatuses, con-
ceptualized by Rapaport as "apparatuses of primary autonomy," 
17. 
become socialized in their content and for.malized in their 
modes of representation. Once this stage is reached, it 
can be said that secondary-process thinking ruled by the 
Reality Principle is superimposed on primary-process think-
ing ruled by the pleasure principle. 
The emergence of the reality principle, however, can-
not be attributed to this change alone. Concomitant with 
the differentiation of the ego, other important alterations 
take place in the structure of the psychic apparatus and 
its processes, which play important roles in the establish-
ment of reality testing and its main tool, secondary-
process thinking. 
The aim of the primar'y' process, under the rule of the 
pleasure principle, is direct discharge of cathexis, and when 
circumstances delay such discharge, affect cathexis or wish-
fulfillment in the for.m of hallucination are used as a sub-
stitute. It should be noted, however, that when the drive 
tension increases and the need-satisfying object is absent 
are already present. SUch apparatuses belong to the "conflict 
free sphe.re of the ego." The "apparatuses of secondary autono-
mt' arise from instinctual. sources or f'rom conflict, i.e., 
they are the result of experience, and in time, they gain in-
dependence from their confl~ctual sources and serve adapta-
tion. Thought, motivations, and values are such apparatuses 
which arise from conflict and gain only relative autonomy, 
since at any time they may become re-involved in conflict. 
See: H. Hartmann, o~. cit., pp. 362-396. Also: D. Rapaport. 
The theory of ego au onomy: a generalization. Bull. of the 
Menninger Cl!n., 1958, ~, pp. 13-35. 
18. 
(delay), disc~ge into affect or ideation may not bring 
about a relief of tension. If such is the case, the drive 
cathexes are either £epressed or bound. 28 Binding is the 
process through which, by the building or structures, the 
drive cathexes change in character and are no longer freely 
mobile; thus large amounts of instinctual energy are pre-
vented from being freely discharged. Ultimately, binding 
serves the economical purpose of saving energ7, which can be 
used for exploratory thought activity and for altering ex-
ternal real1t1 to attain the object. 
Repression prevents the discharge of mobile energies 
into action, affect or ideation. The repressed ideation is 
then conceptualized as unconscious, i.e., its memory trace 
cannot be cathected. The psychic apparatus also puts a 
barrier against the drive cathexis, preventing discharge 
into hallucinatory consciousness. This barrier is itself an 
energy-charge conceptualized as countercathexis, and the 
system of all such countercathexes Freud called censorship.29 
The establishment of the censor marks an advancement of the 
psychic structure because now not only the repressed but all 
the drives are under control, i.e., although originally 
28 s. Freud. Negation. In D. Rapaport 
zation and patholo~ of thought. .New York: 
Press, 195t; pp. 33 -348. _ . . 
(Ed.) , Organi-
Columbla Un!v. 
29 s. Freud. The inten>retation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955. 
19. 
countercathexes had aimed to repress specific drives, a:f'ter 
censorship has amerged as a structure it comes to control 
and delay the discharge of ~ drive cathexes, so that it 
can now repress those thoughts which are even remotely con-
nected with the originally repressed drive. 
The delay of discharge seen in the primary process was 
an involuntary one arising from external circumstances; 
whereas the establishment of countercathexes (secondar7 pro-
cess) converts this externall7 controlled delay into an in-
ternally controlled one, assuring postponement of discharge 
until external reality conditions have been found suitable 
for it. 
The integration of countercathexes into a system of 
censorship is economically valuable to the organism, because 
thus cathectic energy is saved and this energy is now at the 
disposal of the new structure, i.e., censorship has gained 
autonomy. The psychic apparatus can utilize this energy for 
countercathexes against the repressed drives as well as for 
the bzpercathexes (attention-cathexes) of ideas.3° Hyper-
cathexes· are essential for an idea to become conscious. 
Previously, drive cathexes alone were sufficient to raise 
the idea to hallucinatory vividness, but now the removal of 
JO s. Freud. Formulation on the two principles of 
mental functioning. In D. Rapaport (Ed.) Organization 
and patholoij: of tho;u,.sht. New York: Columoia Unlv. Press, 
1951, PP• 3 -32B. 
20. 
the countercathexes, put against the drive energy, is not 
sufficient in itsel£ to make a memory conscious: the idea 
must obtain an additional cathexis (attention-cathexis) to 
become conscious. Ideas which can be made conscious, but 
at the moment are not so, are called preconscious, i.e., not 
countercathected but without hypercathexes. A system of 
censorship is conceptualized as existing not only between 
unconscious and preconscious, but also between preconscious 
and conscious. The censor cont~ls the hypercathexes of 
processes and ideas existing in the preconscious and un-
conscious. Various forms of autistic thinking are observed 
when, because of the weakness of the censor, preconscious 
and unconscious ideas find easy access into consciousness. 
Establishment of countercathexes (leading to repression 
of drives) and the process of binding are among the important 
signs of the start of secondary-process thinking and occur 
concomitantly with the changes that take place in the other 
aspects of thought. It was noted above that in the absence 
of the need-satisfying object, delay of discharge, besides 
resulting in affect or ideation, also results in the differ-
entiation of the drive cathexes into partial drives or 
drive derivatives. 
The progressive differentiation of the ob-jects of these partial drives together with 
the enrichment by experience of the range 
of drive representations, results in over-
lapping systems in which depending on its 
context, an idea or object may be repre-
sentative o£ any o£ several drives. Thus 
the exclusive equivalence o£ ideas in ter.ms 
of the drive around which they are or-
ganized breaks down and transi tiona and 
equivalences between the several systems 
o£ drive organizations of memory become 
£easible. A particular idea is no longer 
dependent upon the mounting tension o£ a 
single drive for its emergence into con-
sciousness. The cathexis of a particular 
idea is no longer exclusively re£erable to 
a single drive.31 
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This implies that drives and drive derivatives have been 
altered in their character, speci£ically in their rhythm, 
discharge conditions, and discharge for.mB, so that they 
tend to be in har.mony with the demands o£ reality, on the 
one hand becoming increasingly amenable to delay and on the 
other hand more flexible as to the conditions of discharge, 
i.e., a greater variety o£ objects and activities will serve 
as their grati£iers. The energy o£ drive derivatives, al-
though once drive-ridden and mobile, now changes into a 
bound for.m and is said to have gained £reedom £rom its 
drive origin, conceptualized as neutralization.32 , 33 
Previously, in the absence o£ the object which gratified 
the drive, the psychic apparatus took the short-cut and hal-
lucinated. This urge £or immediate gratification and the 
3l D. Rapaport. Organization and pathologz of thought. 
New York: Columbia Un!v. Press, 1.951, p. 69t>. 
32 Ibid. 
-
33 H. Hartmann. PR• c!t., pp. 362-396. 
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striving toward a perceptual identity is now replaced by a 
mechanism of delaz and detour and striving toward thought 
identity: Through experientially meaningful connections of 
ideas, the psychic apparatus seeks the object in reality or 
attempts to alter reality so as to find the object. Eco-
nomically, energy is saved when it is no longer discharged 
in hallucinations, since now only small amounts of cathexes 
are sufficient to arouse memories. The energy saved from 
this delay is stored for action to alter reality, to find 
the object and to gratify the need. 
In the drive-organized memory of primary-process think-
ing, ideas were easily interchanged on the basis of their 
belongingness to the same drive. In this new organization 
or memory, the transition from one idea to another is de-
termined b7 their "connectedness along the pathways in 
reality toward the need satisf,-ing object." The connections 
are in ter.ms of reality: space, time, contiguity and simi-
larity. Thus the drive organization of memories gives rise 
to a conceptual organization, and thought activity becomes 
abstract when it was previously concrete.34 Memory, which 
is built on an autonomous inborn apparatus, during the 
34 Goldstein, K. Methodological approach to the study 
of schizophrenic thought disorder. In J. s. Kasanin (Ed.) 
Limage and thwt in s chizoRhrenia. Berkeley: Uni v. 
0~. :presEt, '19. , pp. 17-4:cJ. 
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development of thought, progressivel7 registers reality 
sequences of events and the drive-organized memory becomes 
the foundation of the later maturing conceptual organiza-
tion and of realit7 testing. 
Secondary-process thinking develops into one of the 
most important apparatuses of the ego in its struggles 
against drives and reality. It is an essential tool used 
b7 the ego for reality appraisal. Unlike ideation, which 
cathects in a mobile fashion and only drive representations 
and accepts or rejects stimuli according to immediate feel-
ings of pleasure or pain, thought with the neutralized and 
bound cathexis at its disposal aims at attaining the need-
satisfying object by detours. This search is conceptualized 
as reality testing. Therefore thought is a refinement of 
the pleasure principle in that it attempts to release the 
tension in the safest and most advantageous way - thus sus-
taining the goal of the pleasure principle. 
It is important to note that the psychic structure 
which brings about ideation or thought is a "structural 
given." There are wide individual differences in the 
properties and elements and potentialities of this psychic 
structure. Individuals differ constitutionally in the in-
tensity of their drives, in their tolerance for tension, 
in their modes of discharge.35 
- · 35 D. Rapaport. Or_sanization and pathology of thought. 
New York: Columbia Univ. ~ess~ 1951, pp. 689~730. 
It should also be noted that the establishment of 
reality testing and secondary-process thinking do not 
eliminate primitive modes of thinking. This reality-
oriented, abstract, logical conceptual organization and 
thought process is superimposed on the drive-motivated 
and drive-organized ones. Although secondary-process 
thinking gains autonomy from its underlying origin, this 
autonomy is always relative. The best example of this 
only relative autonomy is slips of the tongue.J 6 "As we 
well know, ·that aim is seldom attained completely, even 
in nor.mal mental life, and our thinking always remains ex-
posed to falsification by interference from the unpleasure 
principle."J7 The pleasure principle continues to exist 
even in the most mature individual. 
To summarize: The psychoanalytic theory differentiates 
between two types of thought: Primary-process thinking 
(ideation) and secondary process thinking (thought). 
It assumes that ideation occurs when instinctual 
energy is discharged by the mode of the primary process, 
which is dominated by the pleasure principle. It asserts 
·-s 3 s. Freud. The pszchopathology of evepzday life. 
New York: Modern Library, 19313 
37 s. Freud. The ·inte!"l'retation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955, p. bOJ. 
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that ideation is the result of a need which seeks grati-
fication. When the need-satisfying object is absent, 
cathexis is directed to the memory image of the object 
and/or the gratification situation which in the past pro-
vided the reduction of this need. 
In ideation, memories are organized in ter.ms of drives. 
Since this type of thinking employs unbound cathexes, one 
drive can stimulate many ideas and one idea can represent 
many drives. Du.e to the mobility of cathexis , primary-
process thinking abides by syncretic mechanisms (condensa-
tion and displacement),uses sensory (particularly visual) 
memories, and lacks spatial, temporal, and causal (logical) 
relationships. 
Ideation occurs in states where the contact with out-
side reality is loosened (i.e., in states of weakened ego). 
Such states are characterized by a lack of differentiation 
between the external and internal worlds, by global, dif-
fuse or partially differentiated, discrete perception and 
thought. In such circumstances, relationships to outside 
objects become autistic and subjective and thought is 
asocial. 
Psychoanalytic theory states that secondary-process 
thinking arises only after the differentiation of the ego 
and the establishment of the reality principle. In this 
type of thinking, the impulse no longer seeks immediate 
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discharge but becomes more or less a conscious wish and is 
satisfied after a period of delay, during which external 
reality is perceived and analyzed in the search for an 
appropriate object; i.e., the organism no longer conceives 
only of what is pleasant (the pleasure principle) but also 
of what is real (the reality principle) although the real 
may be unpleasant. 
In this system, memory is organized in logical frames 
of reference in line with reality and the images are 
checked and compared with their corresponding objects in 
the external world. Logic is based on abstract concepts, 
organized in terms of space, time and causality. Before 
acting, the individual considers a whole range of objects 
and ideas related to a series of motives, poss~.bili ties, 
limitations. This type of thinking is capable of communi-
cation and is called social. 
CHAPTER lli 
STUDIES ON THE GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 
No direct attempt has previousl7 been made within the 
framework or psychoanal7tic theo~ to study the grammatical 
structure of primary-process thinking. HOwever, outside of 
ps7choanalytic theory, research on linguistic phenomena has 
been carried out. These studies often have only indirect 
or no relevance to Freud's and Rapaport's formulations on 
cognition, but some of them can be utilized in the applica-
tion of a grammatical analysis to primary-process thinking. 
Many workers interested in linguistic phenomena have 
repeatedly demonstrated a relationship between personality 
and speech. Some have dealt with this phenomenon in ter.ms 
of literary style;38 others have investigated the relation-
ship between temperament and the rhythm, tempo, pitch, or 
resonance of vocalization.39 , 40 Some have attempted to con-
struct a characterological typology on the basis of types of 
38 F. H. Allport, L. Walker, and E. Lathers. written 
composition. and characteristics of personality. Arch. 
Psychol., 1934, 173, p. 82. -
39 T. K. Davis. Sounds in language. J. nerv. men. 
dis., 1938, 88, pp. 491-500. 
- -
4° L. Wagoner. Speech as an indication of tempera-
mental traits. Quart. J, SReech and Educ., 1925, ~' pp. 237-
242. 
27 
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speech and thought. 41 ' 4.2 There have also been many who 
were particularly interested in the problem of individual 
differences in semantic behavior and in the psychological 
significance of poor semantic habits in the general adjust-
ment of the individual.43, 44, 45, 46 Some workers, par-
re-ticularly the speech clinicians,47, 48 have carried out 
search on the relationship between effective speech and 
effective personality. There are also studies dealing with 
41 G. Dieter. Typische denkformen in ihrer beziehung 
zur Grundstruktur der Personlichkeit. z. Pszchol., 1934, 
Supp. Vol. 24, 13-233· 
42 J. Krechel. Personlichkeitstypus un sprache. 
Arch. ees. Psychol., 1933, ~' PP• 449-524. 
43 J. w. Chotlos. A statistical and comparative 
analysis of written language samples. Pszchol. Monogr., 
1944, Z§, No. 2, pp. 77-111. 
44 Helen Fairbanks. The quantitative differentiation 
of samples of spoken language. Pszcho!• Mono gr., 1944, .2§, 
No. 2, 19-41. 
46 M~ B. Mann. The quantitative differentiatio~,of 
samples of written language. Pslchol. Monogr., 1944, 22, 
No. 2, PP• 41-74. 
47 G. Moore. Personality changes resulting from 
training in speech. §EeechMonosr., 1935, !, pp. 56-60. 
48 J. A. Tracy. A study of personality traits of 
m:tUN actors and mature public speakers. Speech Monogr., 
1935, g, pp. 53-56. 
the diagnostic signi£ioance o£ specific linguistic con-
structions.49, 50, 5l, 52, 53 It bas also been observed 
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that major aberrations of personality are reflected in 
verbal behavior, and that various pathological syndromes 
have more or less characteristic speech behavior. For ex-
ample, Balkan and Masserman,54 with a psychoanalytic orien-
tation, attempted to test the differences among three types 
ot clinical groups in terms of unconscious dynamics and the 
formal characteristics of their speech on TAT productions. 
The results or the study demonstrated that patients diag-
nosed as hysterics, anxiety-states and obsessive-compulsives 
showed signi£icant differences in the £or.mal characteristics 
o£ their language. Glauber55 on the other hand, with the 
49 H. Jules. Linguistic expression of emotion. 
Amer. AnthroR., 1936, ~, pp. 250-256. 
50 s. N~w.man. Personal srmbolism in language patterns. 
Psrchiat., 1939, £, pp. 177-184. 
5l H. Odbert. Approach to language behavior through a 
test of word meaning. Am~r. Psrcholosist, 1948, .J., pp. 274-275. 
52 F. sanford. Speech and personality. Pszchol. Bull., 
1942, .J.2, pp. 811-84$. 
53 E. sapir. Speech as personal! ty. Ame.r. J t. Sociol., 
1927, ~~ pp. 892-905. 
54 E. A. Ba.lken and J. H. Masserman. The language of 
phantasy III: The language of the phantasies of patients 
with conversion hysteria, anxiety states and obsessive-
compulsive neurosis. J4 Psycho1., 1940, 1Q, 75-86. 
55 P. Glauber. Speech characteristics of psychoneurotic 
patients. ~· SEeech and Hearing Dis., 1944, 2, PP• 18-30. 
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notion that speech disorders are a reflection of the dis-
order of the total personality, attempted to relate re-
gressive character types to regressive speech types. He 
differentiated three such types, namely oral, compulsive, 
and genital, each with specific characteristics of speech 
and personality. Wolf56 made an interesting observation 
concerning speech changes and personality dynamics: he 
demonstrated that the grammatical structure of speech changes 
when the patient responds to a theme related to underlying 
personality factors, i.e., defensive areas. Mowrer57 noted 
that during the course of psychotherapy, definite changes 
occur in the structure of the language the patient uses. 
Feldman58 also made a stmilar observation on his patients. 
He noted that the speech of the patient shows certain 
peculiarities during periods of anxiety, and that the 
patient habitually uses certain phrases as a means of pro-
tection against anxiety-arousing situations. 
56 J. Wolf. Neurotic defenses in obsessive-compulsive 
and hysteric patients expressed in language behavior. Un-
published doctoral dissertation, Boston University, 1954. 
57 H. o. :tmowrer. Changes in verbal behavior during 
psychotherapy1 with special referen_ ce to resistance. In H. o. Mowrer \Ed.) Pslchotheraf: Theo~ and research. 
New York: Ronald Pl'ess _co., 19 3, pp. 45-545. _ 
58 s. Feldman. Mannerism of speech. Pszchoanal. 
quart., 1948, 11, pp. 356-367. 
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Of the studies carried out on grammar, the linguistic 
behavior of the child has attracted the greatest interest. 
Both the theoretical59, 60 , 61 and the experimental62, 63, 64 
studies done in this area are ext.remely abundant. 
The extensive literature on linguistic phenomena offers 
valuable suggestions for the present research, which aims to 
investigate the grammatical structure of primary-process 
thinking under a state of weakened ego controls, experi-
. mentally produced (by alcohol intoxication). Particularly 
those studies dealing with the diagnostic significance of 
grammatical forms and with language changes in cases of psy-
chopathology are of great value to this research. In this 
chapter some of the findings obtained from such studies will 
59 G. A. Miller. L£:Wage and communication. New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1951, 1st e • . 
60 c. Os ood. 
research prob~ems. 
No. 4. 
Psycholinguistics: Survey of theo~ and 
SUpp. J, abnor.m. soc. Psychol., 1954, ~' 
61 J. Piaget. The langua~e and thought of the child. 
2nd ed., London: Routied~i 32. 
62 J. E. Anderson. 
linguistic development. 
An evaluation of certain indices of 
Child Devel., 1939, ~' pp. 62-68. 
63 R. Brown. Linguistic determinism and the part of 
speech. J. abnor.m. soc. Pszcbol., 1957, 22, pp. 1-5. 
64 Dorothea McCarthy. Language development in children. 
In L. Ca~ichael (Ed.) Manual of Child Psycholo5Z• New 
York: Wiley, 1946, pp. 416-581. 
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be summarized. 
Attempts have been made to relate degree of asociali-
zation, autism and egocentricity to language behavior. The 
most striking rigure in this area is Zipf65, 66, 67 who re-
lates the disturbance in the equilibrium between the allo-
centric and egocentric elements of speech to autism, ego-
centricity, and to the tendency to use language for purposes 
other than social communication. Zipf considers speech a 
tool which obeys the "principle of least effort," i.e., the 
tendency to save energy which in the long run helps the 
organism to maintain its equilibrium - order, organization, 
and harmony. Two forces are assumed to be operating behind 
the need for equilibrium, one tending to maintain it and the 
other tending to destroy it. The more rapidly order is 
destroyed, the greater is the concomitant emotion and the 
greater is the attempt to re-establish harmony by reorgani-
zation. Crystallization of habit is the result of the prin-
ciple of leas~ efrort which helps to save energy, and causes 
· 6; G. K. Zipr •. Psychobiology of language. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 193'5. 
66 G. K. Zipf and J. c. Whiteburn. Schizophrenic 
language. Arch. Neuro~. and Psychiat., 1943, ~' pp. 831-851. 
67 G. K. Zipf. Human behavior and the !rinciple of 
least effort. Cambridge, Mass: Addlson-Wes~ey, 1949. 
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the organism to repeat what it has acquired. But a high 
degree of crystallization of habit leads to a dull ex-
istence which the organism tries to avoid by creating change. 
Zipf noted that speech, like any other tool, follows 
this principle, i.e., the stream of speech has an order (an 
equilibrium). Although people choose words according to 
their meaning, they follow a relative frequency in their 
choice, of which they are unaware. However, he considered 
speech different from other tools in that it is a socio-
economic device for saving effort in the attainment of goals. 
It therefore involves (a) the economy of the speaker (repe-
tition of speech elements) and (b) the economy of the lis-
tener {diversification of speech elements). Zipf expressed 
this relationship as the Type-Token Ratio. He considered 
disturbance in the equilibrium between repetition and diversi-
fication of speech elements as a sign of disturbance 1n social 
adjustment. On the basis of extensive studies he carried out 
on schizophrenic language, he noted that there was a signi-
ficant disturbance in the word frequencies of such patients, 
which he attributed to autism. In an autistic person, he 
found a tendency towards a high number of egocentric ele-
ments in speech, i.e., a tendency to crowd a large number of 
meanings into a relatively mmall number of words {repetition), 
or a high number of allocentric elements, i.e., a tendency to 
use so great a number of words as to be incomprehensible 
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(diversification). In both cases, speech, as a tool, lost 
its main purpose: social communication. A normal adult, 
by keeping an equilibrium between egocentric and allocentric 
elements in his speech, remains in communicative contact 
with h1 s enviromnent. 
The same tendency (i.e., egocentricity, autism, and 
asociability) has been related by others68, 69, 7° to the 
increased use of first-person pronouns, to the disturbed 
frequency of nouns, conjunctions, prepositions and adjectives, 
and to a heavy emphasis on the past tense.7l, 72 , 13 
The best theoretical treatment of egocentricity is 
offered by Piaget74 who has concentrated his interest on the 
language and thought of the child. Piaget asserts that due 
to the lack of differentiation of the child from his 
68 J. E. Anderson. op ... cit., pp. 62-68. 
69 Maria Lorenz. Language behavior in manic patients. 
Arch. Neurol. and Pszchiat., 1953, £2, pp. 14-26. 
70 Maria Lorenz and s. Cobb. Language behavior in 
psychoneurotics. Arch. Neurol. and Psychiat., 1953, 69 
pp. 684-694. --
71 J. w. Chotlos. op. cit., pp. 77-111. 
72 Helen Fairbanks. op. cit., pp. 14-41• 
13 Mary B. Mann. op. cit., pp. 41-74. 
74 J. Piaget. The l~age and thought of the child. 
2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1932. 
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environment, and lack o~ awareness o~ his own identity, the 
child co~uses his subjective li~e with the external one and 
thus tends to perceive and interpret the world o~ events 
only in relation to his own self, i.e., his "I.n75 
Zipf76 also used the type-token ratio as a measure o~ 
the degree of differentiation, integration, and unity o~ 
thought and speech. Speech which tends toward extreme 
repetitiveness definitely lacks fine discriminations among 
its elements. Speech which tends to shift abruptly between 
excessive repetitiveness and diversi~ication lacks unity 
and homogeneity of discourse. 
Lorenz and Cobb77 studied lack of diversity and flex-
ibility in communication in psychoneurotics with the appli-
cation of the type-token ratio, and Chotlos,78 Fairbanks,79 
Johnson80 and Mann81 applied it to schizophrenics and 
1~ See pp. 14-15 for a more detailed discussion of 
this topic. 
76 G. K. Zipf. Repetition of words. J. gen. Pszcbol., 
1945, ~' pp. 127-148. 
77 Maria Lorenz and s. Cobb. op. cit., pp. 684-694. 
78 J. w. Chotlos. op. cit., pp. 77-111 
79 Helen Fairbanks. op. cit., pp. 19-41. 
BO w. Johnson. Studies in language behavior: A pro-
gram of research. Psi?ho1L Monogr., 1944, Z§, No. 2, 1-15. 
81 Mary B. Mann. op. cit., pp. 41-74. 
children. Lorenz, however, also noted that an increased 
use of indefinite pronouns (particularly "it") indicates 
a lack of particularization, that the substitution of pro-
nouns for names makes the boundaries of objects vague, dif-
ferentiating less clearly the limitations and specificities 
of objects and ideas. The same author attributes a decrease 
in the use of adjectives to a lessened degree of awareness 
of qualifying and differentiating characteristics of objects. 
It has been noted82 ' 83, 84, 85 that variability and incon-
sistency in the use of prepositions and interjections is 
also indicative of disorganization. 
A tendency towards flexibility-variability versus 
rigidity-stereotypy has been explained by Korzybski.86 He 
maintains that applications of dichotomous class categories 
to a world of events which is not 41ehotomous and the fre-
quent use of ter.ms of "allness" reveals a rigid personality 
rather than a flexible one. According to Korzybski, this 
is most typical of paranoiacs, who have dogmatic, rigid, 
82 J. w. Chotlos. op. cit., pp. 77-111. 
83 Helen Fairbanks. op. ci!., pp. 19-41. 
84 w. Johnson. op. cit., pp. 1-15. 
85 Mary B. Mann. op. cit., pp. 41-74. 
86 A. Korzybski. ol'• cit., pp. 545. 
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stubborn, inflexible personalities. The opposite is often 
observed in schizophrenics, who tend to use such ter.ms less 
frequently and do not emphasize dichotomous classifications, 
indicating their indecisive, indefinite and bland attitude. 
A tendency towards concreteness and being bound to the 
immediate situation has also been related to grammatical 
forms. Lorenz87, 88 noted this in the frequent,use of per-
sonal pronouns and in the heavy emphasis on the present tense 
and the simple past tense. Nouns have also been used as a 
measure of concreteness. 89, 90 On the basis of the notion 
that children's speech is more concrete and adults' more 
abstract, Brown91 compared the types of nouns {superordinate 
and subordinate) used by these two groups. He noted that 
children are more likely to name concrete objects (i.e., 
objects with characteristic visual contours and sizes), 
whereas adults produce more abstract nouns {those which are 
87 Marfa Lorenz. Language behavior in manic patients. 
Arch. Neurol. and Psrchiat., 1953, ~~ pp. 14-26. 
88 Maria Lorenz ~d s. Cobb. 02• cit., 684-694. 
89 5 R. Brown. op. cit., pp. 1- • 
90 Eleanor Rowland. Psychological experiences con-
nected with different parts of speech. Pszchol. Mono~., 
1907, ~~No. 32, pp. 1-42. 
91 R. Brown. o;p •• cit., pp. 1-5. 
not "picturable"). 
The relation between abstract thought and conjunctions 
has been pointed out by Piaget92, 93 as well as by Freud94 
and Rapaport.95 The latter maintain that conjunctions are 
absent in primary-process thinking, since ideation lacks 
logical,causal, temporal, and spatial relationships. On the 
basis of the observations he has carried out on children, 
Piaget maintains that the use of conjunctions appears to-
gether with the emergence of abstract thought. He notes the 
absence of "because" during tbe egocentric stage, and main-
tains that it appears only after the age of 7 or 8, w1 th the 
socialization of thought and the acquisition of logical 
reasoning and insight into cause and effect relationships. 
Piaget also notes in the child's language an absence of 
questioning into the causal relationships of events and the 
emergence of such inquiry after the development of abstract 
thought. 
92 J.·Piaget. The laneua~e and thought in the child. 
2nd ed., London: Routledge_, 1 32. 
93 J. Piaget. Judgement and reasoning in the child. 
New York: Harcourt, Bl'ace, 1928. '" 
94 s. Freud. The interpretation of dreams. New York: 
Basic Books, 1955, P: 534· . 
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The lack of conjunctions has been noted by others96, 97,98 
in the speech of schizophrenics, and children as well. 
Emotional stability or lability have generally been re-
lated to adjectives. The first attempt was made by Busemann99 
in 1925, who suggested that the relation of verbs and ad-
jectives is closely related to emotional stability. He ex-
pressed the relation of adjectives (called "qualitative con-
struction") to verbs (called "active construction") by an 
action qu~tient (Aq = ~). Busemann demonstrated that Aq 
varied in a given child from year to year and that, in 
adults, an increase in the number of verbs was accompanied 
by an increase in emotional instability. 
Busemann's adjective-verb ratio has been employed ex-
tensively by workers interested in personality differences in 
language. Boder,lOO for example, showed a similarity between 
Busemann's two dimensions of speech style and Rorschach's 
distinction between kinaesthetic and color responses in the 
96 Helen Fairbanks. op. cit., pp. 19-41. 
97 Mary B. Mann. op. cit., pp. 41-74. 
98 J. w. Chotlos. op. cit., pp. 77-111. 
99 F. sanford. op. cit., pp. 811-845. 
100 D. P. Boder. The adjective-verb quotient: a con-
tribution to the psychology of language. Psychol. Rec., 1940, 
J, pp. JlO-J4J• 
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ink-blot test. Rorschach had maintained that kinaesthetic 
(verb) responses are given by introverted people, whereas a 
preponderance of color (qualitative) responses reflects the 
excited, alert, extroverted person. 
Balkan and Masser.man101 observed that a high adjective-
verb quotient indicates a high degree of anxiety. The quali-
tative, subjective aspects of adjectives were also observed 
by Rowland,102 who notes that adjectives often express the 
affective coloring of an experience. Mayers and Mayers,103 
too, noted a relationship between depression, flattened 
affect, and a decrease in the use of adjectives. 
Verbs, on the other hand, have been consistently re-
lated to action, and specifically to activity and passivity. 
Southardl04 was one of the first to call attention to this. 
In 1916, while attempting to make a descriptive analysis of 
a patient's manifest delusions, Southard observed that the 
grammatical voice {active, passive, reflexive) is always used 
by the patient in relation to his environment. When the 
161 E. A. Balkan and J. H. Masser.man. op. cit., pp. 75-86. 
102 Eleanor Rowland. op. cit., pp. 1-42. 
103 A. N. Mayers and E. B. Marers. Grammar-rhetoric 
indicator. J. nerv. men. Dis., 1946, 104, pp. 604-610. 
104 E. E. Southard. A descriptive analysis of manifest 
delusion. J. ~bn. Psychol., 1916, ~' pp. 189-202. 
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patient feels that he is dominating his environment, he tends 
to use the active voice, and a passive voice when he feels 
dominated. Southard maintained that the reflexive voice, 
which can in itself be active or passive, is a reflection 
of the patient's relation to himself, i.e., to his ego. 
Othersl05, 106, 107 have also noted a relationship of verbs 
to activity and passivity in mental patients. 
The disorganization, confusion, and lack of coherence 
of the speech of the mental patient has been noted by almost 
all the workers interested in linguistic behavior. Most of 
the investigators108, l09, llO, lll, 112 note that in mental 
patients, language does not meet the requirements of communi-
cation. Associations are based on superficial laws and are 
conditioned by affect. Ideas are not focused on a given 
lOS E. A. Balkan and J. H. Masser.man. op. cit., pp. 75-86. 
106 A. N. Mayers and E. B. Mayers. op. cit., pp. 604-610. 
107 Maria Lorenz and s. Cobb. op. cit., pp. 684-694. 
108 Helen Fairbanks. op. cit., pp. 19-41. 
109 Mary B. Mann. op. cit., pp. 41-74. 
110 J. w. Chotlos. op. cit., pp. 77-lll. 
lll P. Glauber. op. cit., pp. 18-JO. 
112 Maria Lorenz. Language concepts as related to psy-
chiatry. guart. Rev. Psychiat. and Neurol., 1952, 1, pp. 123-
1)8. 
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subject and speech is either too meager or too diversified 
to be comprehensible. Neologisms are frequent. There is 
sometimes a lack of prepositions, indicating a loss of 
spatial organization and, 1n severely confused patients, 
articles may be omitted.113 
In summa~, The above studies indicate that personality 
characteristics can be reflected 1n certain grammatical for.ms 
and also that pathological disorders reveal a language struc-
ture quite different .from that of a normal adult. There seems 
to be a number of linguistic indications which reveal the un-
derlying problems or symptoms. However, it is~clear also 
that there are varia tiona among the workers with regard to 
the application o.f grammatical for.ms to personality charac-
teristics or clinical mani.festations - e.g., ,egocentricity is 
detected by Zipf114 in the type-token ratio ·and by Lorenz,115 
Chotlos,ll6 Fairbanks,ll7 and Mann118 in the use of 
ii3 A. N. Mayers and E. B. Mayers. op. cit., pp. 604-610. 
114 G. K. Zkp.f and J. c. Whiteburn. op. cit., 831-851. 
115 Maria Lorenz. Language behavior in manic patients. 
Arch. Neurol. and Pszchiat., 1953, .§2, pp. 14-26. 
116 J. w. Cbotlos. o~. cit., pp. 77-111. 
117 Helen Fairbanks. op. cit., pp. 19-41. 
118 Mary B. Mann. o~. cit., pp. 41-74. 
first-person pronouns, indicating the possibility that 
personality characteristics may be revealed in different 
grammatical for.ms at the same t~e. 
~. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEDREI'ICAL FORMULATIONS AND PREDICTIONS 
ON THE GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE OF PRDIARY-
PROCESS THINKING 
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to integrate 
the theoretical formulations of Freud and Rapaport on the 
primary process with the results of research carried out on 
language behavior. With this as the basis, a hypothetical 
formulation of grammatical structure typical of speech 
dominated by the primary process will be presented. The 
operational applications of these formulations, as applied 
to speech in a state of weakened ego controls, will follow 
each rationale. Under a given set of conditions of normal 
ego controls and weakened ego controls, the following pre-
dictions are made on the grammatical structure of primar,--
process thinking. Each prediction is based on or derived 
from theoretical formulations with regard to primary processes. 
Rationale I: Asociability and Autism 
Central to Freud's differentiation of primary-process 
thinking from secondary-process thinking is the degree of 
orientation to external reality. Regulated by the pleasure-
principle, primary-process thinking seeks immediate discharge 
and if such is not possible, takes the short-cut and hallu-
cinates. In secondary-process thinking, the urge for 
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immediate gratification and striving toward a ~erceptual 
identity is replaced by a mechanism of delay and detour, 
and striving toward a thought identity. Through experi-
entially meaningful connections of ideas, the psychic ap-
paratue seeks the object in reality or attempts to alter 
reality so as to find the object. This search is concep-
tualized as Reality Testing. Thus secondary-process think-
ing attempts to adapt itself to reality demands, whereas 
primary-process thinking has no such aim. It is thus 
described as being asocial, autistic, and incapable of 
communication through socially accepted modes. This autistic 
characteristic of primarJ-process thinking may be det~cted 
in its grammatical structure by the disturbance in the 
equilibrium between the tendency towards diversification and 
repetitiveness in speech. A person who is oriented to exter-
nal reality considers his listener and speaks in a manner 
easy for the other person to understand, whereas an asocial 
person, having no concern for his listener, tends to be 
either too repetitive or too diversified in his language and 
is difficult to understand in both cases. In speech dominated 
by the primary processes, there is apt to be a greater tendency 
toward repetition since such thought lacks intellectual deve-
lopment required for diversification. 
Prediction 1. The ratio of the number of different 
words to the total number of words used in the state of 
weakened ego controls will be smaller than the ratio of the 
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number of different words to the total number of words used 
in the state of normal ego controls. 
Rationale II: Egocentricitz 
Freud also describes primary-process thinking as being 
egocentric, its egocentricity resulting from the withdrawal 
of the cathexes into the self rather than being directed to 
objects in external reality. Egocentricity is apt to mani-
fest itself grammatically in the increased use of first-
person pronouns. 
Prediction 2. The ratio of the number of first-person 
pronouns to the total number of words used in the state of 
weakened ego controls will be greater than the ratio of the 
number of first-person pronouns to the total number of words 
used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Rationale III: Diffuseness and Lack of Differentiation 
The inability to differentiate the external world from 
the internal one also makes primary-process thinking diffuse, 
undifferentiated, and vague. This c~'e·teristic of primary'-
process thinking can .be detected in its grammar by the in-
creased use of indefinite pronouns, since such grammatical 
for.ms are in themselves vague: they do not clearly differ-
entiate the limitations and specificities of objects and ideas. 
Prediction J• The ratio of the number of indefinite pro-
nouns to the total number of words used in the state of 
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weakened ego controls will be greater than the ratio of the 
number of indefinite pronouns to the total number of words 
used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Rationale IV: Lack of Qualification and suantification 
Since prima.ry-p.rocess thinking is diffuse, it fails to 
make a definite estimate and evaluation of events, ideas and 
feelings, and does not specify their amounts. In such a 
thought process, the principle of all-or-none rules, and 
there is no consideration for qualification or quantifi-
cation of the world of events. 
Among grammatical forms, intensifiers and adverbs offer 
us a means of detecting this characteristic of primary-
process thinking, because the former modify and quantify 
feelings and the latter express relations of place and time 
and specify the manner of events, thoughts and feelings. 
Prediction 4a· The ratio of the number of intensifiers 
to the total number of words used in the state of weakened 
ego controls will be smaller than the ratio of the number 
of intensifiers to the total number of words used in the 
state of normal ego controls. 
Predic~ion ~b. The ratio of the number of adverbs to 
the total number of words used in the state of weakened ego 
controls will be smaller than the ratio of the number of 
adverbs to the total number of words used in the state of 
normal ego controls. 
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Rationale V: Fusion of Affect with Thought - Subjectivitz 
Whereas secondary-process thinking avoids being led 
astray by the intensity of feelings, primary-process think-
ing is affect-laden and thus tends to be subjective. Al-
though freedom of thought from affect is never totally 
achieved, in normal circumstances thought is more objective 
and less affect-laden than in a condition in which the 
primary~processes are dominant. 
Among grammatical for.ms, adjectives are the ones which 
most easily reveal affect. Since the domination of feelings 
over thoughts often creates a state of subjectivity, it would 
be expected that language behavior observed under the primary 
processes would contain a large number of adjectives. 
The lack of objectivity and the fusion of instinctual 
needs with objective, rational thinking may also manifest 
itself in the character of nouns. One would expect an in-
crease in the number of subjective nouns, which tend to be 
based on personal judgments and feelings, rather than in ob-
jective ones which have relatively well-defined and socially 
accepted criteria, boundaries and structures. 
A third grammatical for.m which would reveal the same 
characteristic of primary-process thinking would be ex-
pletives, which are often meaningless expressions of sheer 
affect. 
Prediction 5a. The ratio of the number of adjectives 
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to the total number of words used in the state of weakened 
I 
ego controls will be greater than the ratio of the number of 
adjectives to the total number of words used ~-n tl:c state nf 
normal ego controls. 
Prediction 5b. The ratio o~ the number of subjective 
nouns to thli! total number of words used in tho state of 
weakened ego controls will be greater than the ratie of the 
number of subjective nouns to the total number of words 
used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Prediction 5c. The ratio of the nutr.ber of expletives to 
the total number of words used in the state of weakened ego 
controls will be greater than the ratio of the number of 
expletives to the total number of words used in the state of 
normal ego controls. 
Rationale VI: Lack of Logical, Causal, Temporal, or Spatial 
Organization 
Psychoanalytic theory states that, as opposed to 
secondary-process thinking which is organized in terms of 
space, time, and causality and can categorize new experiences 
and consider simultaneously various aspects, limitations, and 
possibilities of a eituation, primary-pr~cess thinking lacks 
reflection and logical justification, and does not have causal, 
spatial, or temporal relationships. These characteristics of 
primary-process thinking manifest themselves in speech by the 
lack of conjunctions. In speech, conjunctions are used to join 
and relate series of thoughts, feelings, or events. 
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Prediction 6. The ratio of the number of conjunctions 
to the total number of words used in the state of weakened 
ego controls will be ~aller than the ratio of the number of 
conjunctions to the total number of words used in the state 
of normal ego controls. 
Rationale VII: Disorganization and FraSffieBtation 
Since primary-process thinking, as defined 1n psycho-
analytic theory, does not have order and causal or temporal 
relations, its expression in speech is often fragmented 
rather than organized and meaningful. The content of thought 
is expressed not in an orderly, easily comprehensible se-
quence, but is presented in disconnected, irrelevant state-
ments which have little apparent relation to each other - at 
least so they appear to a psychologically naive listener. 
The grammatical rules and principles of language are 
disregarded and thoughts are conveyed in incomplete ex-
pressions and phrases rather than in full, organized sentences. 
Predicti£n 7a. The organization of the total speech 
sample will be worse in the state of weakened ego controls 
than the organization of the total speech sample in the 
state of normal ego controls. 
Pr~diction 7b. The ratio of the number of poorly or-
ganized sentences to the total number of words used in the 
state of weakened ego controls will be greater than the ratio 
of the number of poorly organized sentences to the total 
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number of words used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Rationale VIII: Directedness to the Immediate Situation 
One of the most striking characteristics of the pril:nary 
process is its direction towards the immediate grQtification 
of drives. Thus this type of thinking is concerned with the 
events or objects themselves rather than with the relations 
of time or cause {order) which unite them. It avoids the 
consideration of future possibilities or an evaluation of 
past experiences. Therefore primary-process thinking is said 
to be oriented to the ~ediate present, since it is in the 
present that the events are experienced as occurring. 
This characteristic of primary-process thinking will 
be best demonstrated by the absence of future or complicated 
tenses and by tb.e heavy emphasis on present and simple past 
tenses in language behavior. 
The same characteristic can also be detected in the in-
terrogative form. Questions, particularly ques~ions of n how' 
and nwhy,n are asked to investigate relationships, sequential 
or temporal order, and are thus typical of secondary-process 
., 
thinking which aims at the investigation of previous events 
or future results. 
Prediction 8a. The ratio of the number of present 
tenses to the total number of words used in the state of 
weakened ego controls will be greater than the ratio of the 
number of present tenses to the total number of words used 
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in the state of normal ego controls. 
Prediction 8b. The ratio of the number of future tenses 
to the total number of words used in the state of weakened 
ego controls will be smaller than the ratio of the number of 
fv,tut:"~· tenses to the total number of words used in the 
state of nor.mal ego controls. 
Prediction 8c. The ratio of the number of complicated 
tenses to the total number of words used in the state of 
weakened ego controls will be smaller than the ratio of the 
number of complicated tenses to the total number of words 
used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Prediction 8d. The ratio of the number of interrogative 
forms to the total number of words used in the state of 
weakened ego controls will be smaller than the ratio of the 
number of interrogative forms to the total number of words 
used in the state of normal ego controls. 
Rationale IX: szncretic Me~haniams - S~bolic E;pressions 
The most investigated characteristic of primary-process 
thinking is ita for.mal aspects. The freely mobile cathexes 
employed by the primary processes make it possible to abide 
by such syncretic mechanimms as condensation, displacement, 
and compromise formation. In this t:ype of thinking, parts 
of objects, events and contradictory feelings which do not 
belong together in nature can be combined to create a new 
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entity. One idea may easily replace another and be a repre-
sentation of it. Such formal characteristics of the primary 
process cause the thought to be expressed in idiosyncratic 
and symbolic language. In its grammatical structure, such 
speech would contain neologisms, fluid linguistic con-
structions, and misuse of words, which are the result of 
the syncretic mechanisms employed by this type of thinking. 
Prediction 9. The ratio of the number of neologisms 
to the total number of words used in the state of weakened 
ego controls will be greater than the ratio of the number 
of neologisms to the total number of words used in the 
state of normal ego controls. 
CHAPTER. V 
THE EXPERnmN'TAL PROCEDURE 
In this research, alcohol intoxication was used as a 
means of bringing about a state of weakened ego controls. The 
extensive literature on alcoholll9, 120 , 121, 122, 123 has 
shown that this drug brings about physiological as well as 
psychological changes in the individual. It has been re-
peatedly pointed out that alcohol has a depressant effect on 
the higher cortical centers of the brain and thus creates a 
state of loosened inhibitions and weak controls. 
The psychological changes brought about by the ingestion 
of high dosages of alcohol are somewhat similar to those ob-
served in states of extreme fatigue, exhaustion, stress, etc. 
Rate of learning, memory, association, judgment, reasoning, 
volition and control of emotional behavior show considerable 
impairment. In states of acute intoxication, contact with the 
i19 Butler Health Center. Prediction and behavior dif-
ferentials in blind administration of alcohol and other drugs. 
Ann. ReE., 1957-58. 
120 H. H. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek. Alcohol e31>lored. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1942. 
12l E. M. Jellinek and R. McFarland. Analysis of psy-
chological experiments on the effects of alcohol. suart. J. 
stud. ale., 1940, ~' 272-371. 
l22 w. w. Jetter. Diagnosis of acute alcohol intoxica-
tion by co.rrela tion of clinical and chemical findings. Amer. 
J. Med. Sci., 1938, 196, 475-487. -
123 A. Selesnick. Alcoholic intoxication. J. Amer. 
Mad. Ass., 1938, 11£, 775-778. 
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external world becomes poor and reality testing is highl~ 
impaired. 
The extent of the impairment of ps~chological functions 
and realit~ appraisal is definitel~ a function of the amount 
of alcohol consumed, the person's own physiological tolerance 
for the drug, and his ps~chological state.l24, 125, 126 
Social factors either negatively or positively reinrorce 
the effects, so that in a comfortable, friendly situation, 
small amounts of alcohol are sometimes sufficient to create 
a state of intoxication, whereas in a controlled, formal 
atmosphere, even very high dosages of alcohol may fail to 
show any effects.127 
In this research, an· experimental set-up was arranged 
with the physiological, psychological, and social factors of 
intoxication in mind so as to create a situation in which 
alcohol intoxication caused considerable loosening of inhi-
bitions and weakening of the ego's defensive and controlling 
mechanisms. The experiment was carried out in the Butler 
121~ P. Hartocollis and D. Johnson. Differentials 
effects of alcohol on verbal fluency. Q.uart. J. stud. ale., 
1956, !I, 183-189. 
125 E. M. Jellinek and R. McFarland. op. cit., pp. 272-
371. 
126 A. Selesnick. op. cit., pp. 775-778. 
l27 Butler Health Center. op. cit. 
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Mental Health Center in Providence, Hhode Island. 
Inde~endent var~able: The two categories of the inde-
pendent variable were operationally defined as: 
A. State of non-intoxication 
B. State of intoxication 
De~endent variable: The dependent va.riable was opera-
tionally defined as the grammar of speech samples in the 
two states. 
!• ExJ?erimental Set-Up 
Twenty~ three li.o.rmal adult subjects were used, eleven 
females and twelve males. Only subjects whose native tongue 
was English, whose age was over twenty, and who were 
occasional and moderate drinkers rather than habitual 
drinkers were accepted for the research. The subjects were 
volunteers. They signed a statement that they had agreed to 
be subjects in the expe.riment of their own accord. {See 
Appendix A for information about the subjects.) 
The laboratory in which the experiment was carried out 
is situated in the basement of the Butler Mental Health Cen-
ter and it is decorated as a very attractive and comfortable 
living room, with a bar at one corner and a one-way mirror 
behind it. A long corridor connects the experimental labora-
tory with another large room, in which the speech samples of 
the subjects were recorded on a recording machine. 
Two observers were situated in the small observation 
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room behind the one-way mirror or the experimental labora-
tory. These observers recorded the subject's changing be-
havior during the experiment. A recording machine, located 
in this observation room, was used to record the social com-
munication among the subjects. A bartender and a hostess 
were present in the experimental laboratory, who also ob-
served and rated the subjects on rating scales. These four 
observers evaluated the subject's reaction to alcohol and 
his degree or intoxication. 
Arrangements were made ror a psychiatrist to interview 
the subjects when each subject was considered to be in a 
state of intoxication by the agreement or the four observers. 
The psychiatrist evaluated the subject's specific reaction to 
the effects or alcohol and his degree or intoxication on a 
four-point scale. Since the psychiatric interview had a 
"sobering effect" on some subjects, in certain cases the psy-
chiatric interview was conducted after the speech samples 
were obtained. If the psychiatrist felt that the subject 
was not intoxicated, a second sample was obtained after the 
subject had more alcohol. Alcometer readings were also ob-
tained from each subject at the end of the psychiatric in-
tervievr. 
All subjects filled out a questionnaire before or on the 
day of the experiment about their background, their degree 
of habituation, tolerance and reaction to alcohol. All 
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subjects were required to drink at least three ounces of 
alcohol. They were encouraged by the bartender and the 
hostess to consume or exceed the amount they themselves 
specified in the questionnaire as their maximum. The alcohol 
used was 190 proof ethyl alcohol which was broken down to 87 
proof with water. This mixture was then mixed with fruit 
juice. Table 1 gives information on each subject with 
regard to psychiatric evaluation, alcometer readings, and 
amount of alcohol consumed. 
The number of subjects in each experimental session 
varied from two to £our. !11 subjects were advised to co~e 
on the day of the experimeut with an empty stomach, or at 
least to have a very light lunch. 
II· Experif!ntal Procedure 
The subjects were divided into three groups in a random 
order: 
Group A 
This group of subjects (H • 7) were subjected to the 
following experimental procedure: 
1. Prelimihary Stage. Whea the subject arrived for 
the experiment, he was told: "This is an experiment on the 
effects of alcohol. First I want to have a short c~nversa­
tion with you and then I will ask you to tell me stories 
about some pictures. After this you will have some drinks 
with your friend and I hope you have a nice time and get 
SUbatects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
* 
Table 1 
THE PSYCHIATRIC RATIIO, DIAGJIOSIS, ALCCJO:.r!R 
READIRJS .MD AMOOHr OF ALCOHOL CONSUMBD 
Psychiatric 
. Rating*. 
-Diagnosis**- - · Alc081eter*** 
... silly-confused .07 
... bypomanic .17 
3-14- manic-depressive .o6 
1 depressed .o48 
3 excited-active .015 
4 agitated-depressed .05 
4 aggressive .08 
2 mild reaction .o4 
3 depressed .12 
3 hypomanic .11· 
2 hypomanic .05 1/2 
3 hypomanic-aggressive ·.o4 
4 schizoid .05 1/2 
2-3 paranoid .03 
2 no change .03 1/2 
4 hypomanic 
2 hypomanic 
3 manic 
4 retarded-depressed 
2 no change .01 
4 b1Pcaan1c .02 
4 defensive-depressed .005 
3 bypomanic ·07 
Alcohol in 
· OllJlCea**** 
12 
6 
7 
6 
8 
11 
15 
13 1/2 
8 
12 
10 
11 
18 1/2 
16 
11 
8 
11 
7 
10 
9 1/2 
14 
8 
8 
A rating ranging trom o-4 was g1 ven to the subject by the psy-
chiatrist. "O" represents no apparent change in behavior, a:rtect or thought 
with intoxication. "4" represents max1llum change with intoxication. 
** A clinical diagnosis by the psychiatrist was made on the reac-
tion ot the subject under alcohol. 
*** Although the alc011eter present at the experimental laboratory ot 
Butler Mental Health Center had been caretully checked by a technician be-
tore the start ot the experiments, the machine otten broke down and gave 
misleading readings. It was not possible to obtain readings tram some 
subjects. 
**** The alcohol used was 190 proof ethyl alcohol which was broken 
down to 8f!i' proof with water (4~ water). This mixture was then mixed in 
the final drink with fruit juice. 
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drunk easily, because the more drunk you feel, the better 
it is for the experiment. I am not interested in what you 
say, in what kind of a story you make, and I am not going to 
analyze you; but I want you to talk as much as possible and 
to feel relaxed. You can ask me questions any time you wish." 
2. State of Non-Intoxication. 
A. Conversational Speech: A conversation lasting 
at least three minutes was carried on between the subject and 
the examiner. The subject was casually asked a standard set 
of questions to initiate and continue the conversation. These 
included questions on the subject's reasons for volunteering 
for the experiment, his friends' reasons, his occupation, in-
terests, his future plans, past experiences, etc. The ex-
aminer remained silent except to encourage further verbali-
zation from the subject. 
B. Stories: Three TAT cards (1, JBM, 4) were 
given to the subject consecutively and he was asked to make 
up a story about them. Standard TAT instructions were given. 
Then two colored surrealistic pictures were given to the sub-
ject. One of these pictures was by Rufino Tamayo and the 
other was by an anony.mous painter. The same directions were 
repeated, with the addition that if he preferred he could 
just talk about the pictures. Since the subjects found it 
very hard to make up stories about these pictures, they 
often told their impressions of them or their personal opinion 
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of modern art. The subject was again reminded that he could 
ask questions if he had any. 
3· Administration of Alcohol. The subject was asked 
to go to the experimental laboratory where alcohol mixed with 
fruit juice was served. A second subject was interviewed in 
the same manner and after his speech sample was obtained, he 
was asked to join the first one. While the two subjects were 
having their first or second drinks, a third subject was sub-
jected to the same procedure, and was asked to join the others. 
The three subjects drank their drinks together in the experi-
mental laboratory and were encouraged to engage in the en-
tertainments provided, like darts, cards, music, etc. 
When one of the three subjects reached the desired 
state of intoxication, as based on the judgment of the four 
observers, the subject was asked to leave the experimental 
room and his alcometer reading was obtained. At this point, 
the usual procedure was the interview with the psychiatrist 
who evaluated the extent of intoxication. 
4. State of Intoxication. 
A. Conversational Speech: A conversation lasting 
at least three minutes was carried on between the subject and 
the examiner. The subject was casually asked a standard set 
of questions to initiate and continue the conversation. 
These included questions on the subject's reactions to the 
experiment, description of the experimental room and the 
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activities of his friends, his previous experiences with 
alcohol, and his own and his friends' plans for the future 
(often the next day). 
B. Stories: Three TAT ca.rds (JGF, 8BM, lJF'M) were 
given to the sUbject consecutively and the directions des-
cribed under Stories in the state of non-intoxication was 
repeated. Then two different colored surrealistic pictures 
were given. One of these pictures was by Rufino Tamayo and 
the other was by Chirico. The same directions were repeated. 
5. Rest Period. The subject was asked to stay in the 
experimental laboratory, and the next subject was subjected 
to the same procedure. SUbjects were not allowed to leave 
the experimental laboratory until they felt well enough to 
leave the hospital grounds under the guidance of a hospital 
staff member. 
Group B 
The second group of subjects (N = 8) were subjected to 
the following experimental procedure: 
1. Preliminarz Stage. Same as above. 
2. state of Non-Intoxication was omitted. 
3. Administration of Alcohol. Same as above. 
4. state of Intoxication. Same as above. 
5. State of Rest. Same as above. 
6. State of Non-Intoxication. The speech samples under 
this stage were obtained from the subjects a few days after 
the experiment. 
Group C 
This group of subjects (N = 8) was divided into two 
groups. Group C-1 was subjected to the same experimental 
procedure as Group A, and Group C-2 was subjected to the 
same experimental procedure as Group B. 
However, in Group C as a whole, the pictures were re-
versed, i.e., in the state of non-intoxication, this group 
received the pictures which were given to Groups A and B in 
the state of intoxication; and in the state of intoxication, 
they received the pictures given to Groups A and B in the 
state of non-intoxication. 
The reader is referred to Table 2 for the distribution 
of the 23 subjects into these three groups. 
Group A 
l 
2 
3 
h 
5 
6 
7 
N • 7 
Males • 2 
Females • 5 
i'able 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF 23 SUBJECTS BY NUMBER IN THE 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
Group C 
Group B Group c-1 
8 16 
9 17 
10 20 
11 21 
12 
13 
lh 
15 
N • 8 N•h 
Males • 6 Males • 2 
Females • 2 Females • 2 
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Group C-2 
J.8 
19 
22 
23 
N • h 
Males • 2 
Females • 2 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
The raw data of this experiment consisted of two types 
of speech s~aples: (1) Speech samples obtained tn the state 
of non-intoxication (control condition); (2) Speech samples 
obtained in the state of intoxication (experimental condition). 
These two speech samples were, in turn, of two kinds: 
(A) Conversational Speech: Conversational speech consisted 
of a casual conversation between the examiner and the subject. 
(B) Stories: Stories consisted of reactions (usually stories) 
to three TAT cards and two colored surrealistic pictures. 
The two kinds of speech samples were analyzed in terms 
of the 16 predictions specified in Chapter IV of this paper. 
Conversational Speech and the Stories were analyzed separate-
ly. Since the total numbers of words used in the state of 
non-intoxication (control condition) and the state of in-
toxication (experimental condition) differed,128 ratio 
scores were calculated and the ratio scores obtained for the 
state of non-intoxication were compared with those obtained 
for the state of intoxication for each subject. The ratio 
scores for the 16 predictions obtained from the 23 subjects 
128 The total number of words was not consistently 
greater in either state but varied with the individual sub-
ject. 
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in the control and experimental conditions are presented in 
Appendix B. 
To determine the number o£ predictions which changed 
in the expected direction in the experilnental condition, 15 
o£ the 16 predictions were tested by the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test and the critical ratio values £or the normal ap-
proximation o£ this test as suggested by Mosteller and Bush 
were obtained. One prediction, the organization of speech, 
was tested by the Sign Test. The null hypothesis was .re-
jected when the probability was equal to or less than the .05 
level on a one-tailed test of significance. 
In order to rule out any differences due to the order 
of conditions, the three groups,l29 which differ in experi-
mental treatment, were compared with respect to the average 
number of changes per subject in the expected direction. 
On Conversational Speech, the mean for Group A was 11.00, 
£or Group B 11.25, and for Group C 11. 6 3. Thus all three 
groups changed in the expected direction with about the 
same average frequency. In the Stories, the mean fo.r Group A 
was 13.14, for Group B 12.63, and £or Group C 12.13. Thus, 
once again, the groups were similar. Hence, thereafter they 
were treated as one group. 
129 Group A: State of non-intoxication was followed 
by state of intoxication. Group B: State of intoxication 
was followed by state of non-intoxication. Group C: The 
two groups of cards were reversed. 
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The null hypothesis, the prediction, analysis or the 
data, and the results obtained ror the 16 predictions are 
given below under the appropriate classirication presented 
in Chapter IV or this paper. 
!• Asociabili~y and Autism 
A. Null HYpothesis. The ratio or the number or dir-
rerent words to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be equal to the ratio or the number 
or dirferent words to the total number or words used in 
the control condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number or different 
words to the total numbe.r or words used in the experimental 
condition will be smaller than the ratio of the number or 
dirrerent words to the total number of words used in the 
control condition. 
c. Analzsis or the data. The type-token ratio was 
obtained in the following manner: First the total number or 
words used in each speech sample-was counted. Then the num-
ber or dirrerent words used in the speech sample was counted. 
The ratio or the number or dirferent words to the total num-
ber of words was obtained. 
D. Results. This prediction was conrir.med. The ratio 
of the number of different words significantly decreased in 
the experimental condition. The results were significant in 
Conversational Speech at the .05 level, and in the Stories at 
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the .01 level. Thus the asocial and autistic characteristics 
of primary-process thinking were experimentally demonstrated. 
!!• Egocentpicity 
A. Null Hypothesis. The ratio of the number of 
first-person pronouns to the total number of words used in 
the experimental condition will be equal to the ratio of 
the number of first-person pronouns to the total number of 
words used in the control condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of first-
person pronouns to the total number of words used in the ex-
perimental condition will be greater than the ratio of the 
number of first-person pronouns to the total number of 
words used in the experimental condition. 
c. Analzsis of the data. First-person pronouns in-
cluded the i'ollowing: "I," "me," "myself," "my," "mine." 
These were counted for each speech sample and ratio scores 
were obtained. 
D. Results. This prediction was confirmed. The 
ratio of i'irst-person pronouns significantly increased in 
the experimental condition. The results were significant 
both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories at the .01 
level. 
III. Diffuseness and Lack of Differentiation 
-
A. Null Hypothesis. The ratio of the number of 
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indefinite pronouns to the total number of words used in the 
experimental condition will be equal to the ratio of the 
number of indefinite pronouns to the total number of words 
used in the control condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of indefinite 
pronouns to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be greater than the ratio of the num-
ber of indefinite pronouns to the total number of words 
used in the control condition. 
c. Analysis of the data. The indefinite pronouns 
consisted of three separate groups: (l) "somebody," "any-
where," and varia tiona of such; ( 2) "it," " they," " its , " 
"theirs," "them"; (3) "that," "those." These were counted 
for each speech sample and the ratio scores for the total 
were obtained. 
D. Results. This prediction was not confir.med. The 
indefinite pronouns showed a non-significant decrease in 
Conversational Speech and in the Stories. Therefore, the 
rationale with regard to the diffuseness and lack of dif-
ferentiation of primary-process thinking was not demon-
strated by the experimental procedure of this research. 
IY· Lack of Qualification and £pantification 
A. Null HzPothesis. The ratio of the number of in-
tensifiers to the total number of words used 1n the 
70. 
experimental condition will be equal to the ratio of the 
number of intensifiers to the total number of words used in 
the control condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of intensi-
fiers to the total number of words used in the experimental 
condition will be greater than the ratio of the number of 
intensifiers to the total number of words used in the 
control condition. 
The same null hypothesis and prediction will hold for 
adverbs. 
c. Analysis of the da~a. 
a. Intensifiers: The intensifiers included words 
like "very," "rather," "quite," etc. These words were 
counted for each speech sample and ratio scores were obtained. 
b. Adverbs: All kinds of adverbs were counted in 
each speech sample and ratio scores were obtained. 
D. Results. 
a. Intensifiers: This prediction was partly con-
firmed. There was a significant decrease at the .01 level in 
the ratio of intensifiers in the Stories but the decrease 
was not significant in Conversational Speech. 
b. Adverbs: This prediction was partly confirmed. 
There was a significant decrease at the .05 level in the 
ratio of the adverbs used in the Stories, but a non-
significant increase in Conversational Speech. 
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The rationale with regard to the lack of qualifica-
tion and quantification of primary-process thinking was 
thus demonstrated only in the speech samples obtained from 
the Stories. 
y. Fusion of Affec~ with Thought - Subjectivity 
A. Null Hypothesis~ The ratio of the number of ad-
jectives to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be equal to the ratio of the number of 
adjectives to the total number of words used in the control 
condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of adjectives 
to the total number of words used in the experimental condi-
tion will be greater than the ratio of the number of ad-
jectives to the total number of words used in the control 
condition. The same null hypothesis and prediction will 
hold separately for subjective nouns and expletives. 
C. Analz.s.is of the data. 
a. AdJectives: Adjectives were counted in each 
sample and ratio scores were obtained. 
b. Nouns: Nouns were divided into three groups: 
1. SUbjective Nouns: These nouns vtere opera-
tionally defined as being "not-picturable" in a dictionary. 
Examples are 11 sadness," 11 electricity," etc. 
2. Objective Nouns: These nouns were opera-
tionally defined as being 11 picturable" in a dictionary. 
Examples are "man," "house,'' etc. 
J. Intermediate Nouns: There were nouns 
which could not be considered Objective or Subjective. 
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These three types of nouns were counted separately and 
the ratio scores of the number of subjective nouns to the 
total number of words were obtained. 
c. §3Pletives: Expletives included exclamations 
like 11 Gosh,t' "My goodness," etc., and expl"essions like "well," 
11 yah, 11 etc., when these did not make any meaningful contribu-
tion to the subject's statement. These we.re counted for 
each speech sample and ratio scores were obtained. 
D. Results. 
a. Adjectives: This prediction was partly con-
firmed. There was a significant increase at the .05 level 
in the ratio of adjectives in the Stories, but the increase 
was not significant in Conversational Speech. 
b. SUbjective nouns: This prediction was not 
confirmed. The subjective nouns showed a non-significant 
increase in the Stories but a non-significant decrease in 
Conversational Speech. 
c. Expletives: This prediction was confirmed. 
The ratio of expletives significantly increased in the ex-
perimental condition. The results were significant at the 
.01 level both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories. 
The rationale with regard to the fusion of affect with 
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thought in ideation leading to subjectivity of thought was 
thus partly demonstrated. 
]1. Lack of Lo~ical, Causal, Teseoral 1 and Spatial Organization 
A. Null Hypothesis. The ratio of the number of con-
junctions to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be equal to the ratio of the number of 
conjunctions to the total number of words used in the control 
condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of conjunc-
tions to the total number of words used in the experimental 
condition will be smaller than the ratio of the number of 
conjunctions to the total number of words used in the con-
tro 1 condition. 
c. Analysis of the data. Conjunctions were divided 
into three groups: 
1. SUbordinators: These were conjunctions of the 
"who" type and the "because" type. Examples are "while," 
"after," "until," etc. 
2. Sentence Connectors or Coordinators: These 
conjunctions stand between sentence patterns and imply some 
relationship between the two sentences. Examples are 
"therefore," "nevertheless," "however, 11 etc. 
3· Conjunctions: There are seven conjunctions in 
the English language: 
" yet , " " so , " and "nor." 
These are: "and" "or" "but " "for" 
' ' ' ' 
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These three groups of conjunctions were counted 
separately and the ratio of the total number of conjunctions 
to the total number of words was obtained. 
D. Results. This prediction was confir.med. The 
ratio of conjunctions significantly dec.reased in the experi-
mental condition. The results were significant at the .01 
level both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories. The 
rationale with regard to the lack of logical, causal, 
temporal, and spatial organization in primary-process think-
ing was experimentally demonstrated. 
1!!• Disorganization and FraS!entation 
A. Null H:vpo th~. 
1. The organization of the total speech sample 
will be the same in the experimental and control conditions. 
2. The ratio of the number of poorly organized 
sentences to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be equal to the ratio of the number 
of poorly organized sentences to the total number of words 
used in the control condition. 
B. Predictions. 
1. The organization of the total speech sample 
will be worse in the experimental condition than in the 
control condition. 
2. The ratio of the numbe.r of poorly organized 
sentences to the total number of words used in the 
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experimental condition will be greater than the ratio of the 
number of poorly organized sentences to the total numh;r ot 
liords used in the control condition. 
c. Analysis of the data. 
1. Organization of the Speech Sample: It was not 
possible to quantify this measure so as to obtain a numerical 
value. Therefore, a criterion for organization of speech 
was established and the speech samples ~ere rated by a 
judge according to this criterion. The reader is referred 
to Appendix C for this criterion. Conversational Speech 
and each of the five stories were rated separately by the 
judge, "t" when the speech sample is organlzed, and "-" 
when the speech sample is disorganized. 
2. Poorly Organized Sentences: This measure was 
composed of two main groups: 
a. Incomplete sentences: This group includes 
repetition of words and sentences which were left unfinished. 
b. Phrases: This group includes the number 
of statements made in phrases rather than in complete gram-
matical sentences. 
Groups a and b were counted separately and the ratio 
of the total of the two (called Poorly Organized Sentences) 
to the total number of words used in each speech sample was 
obtained. 
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D. Results. 
1. Organization of the Speech Saffiple: This pre-
diction was confirmed. The organization of the total speech 
sample became significantly worse in the experimental condi-
tion. The evaluations of the judge were significant in Con-
versational Speech at the .05 level and in the Stories at 
the .01 level by the Sign Test. 
2. Poorly Organized Sentences: This prediction 
was confir.med. The ratio of the poorly organized sentences 
significantly increased in the experimental condition. The 
results were significant at the .01 level, both in Conversa-
tional Speech and in the Stories. 
The rationale with regard to the disorganization and 
fragmentation of primary-process thinking was experimentally 
demonstrated. 
VIII. Directedness to the Immediate Situation 
-
A. Null HZPothesis. The ratio of the number of present 
tenses to the total number of words used in the experimental 
condition will be equal to the ratio of the number of present 
tenses to the total number of words used in the control con-
di tion. 
Null HIPothesis. The ratio of the number of future 
tenses to the total number of words used in the experimental 
condition will be equal to the ratio or the number of future 
tenses to the total number of words used in the control 
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condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of present 
tenses to the total number of words used in the experimental 
condition will be greater than the ratio of the number of 
present tenses to the total number of words used in the 
control condition. 
Prediction. The ratio of the number of future tenses 
to the total number of words used in the experimental con-
dition will be smaller than the ratio of the number of 
future tenses to the total number of words used in the 
control condition. 
The null hypothesis and the prediction made in rela-
tion to the future tenses will also hold for the complicated 
tenses and the interrogative forms. 
c. Analysis of the data. 
1. Present Tenses: The present tense consisted of 
the following: 
a. Present tense: "I go." 
b. Obligation: "I should go." 
c. Simple past tense: "I went." 
For practical purposes, the total of these three tenses 
was called the Present Tense. These three groups were counted 
separately in each speech sample and the ratio scores for the 
total were obtained. 
2. Future Tense: The future tense included the 
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following: "shall," "will," "going to." These were counted 
for each speech sample and ratio scores were obtained. 
3· Complicated Tenses: The complicated tense 
included the following and theil' variations: "I have gone," 
"I might have gone," "I could have gone," "I would have been 
going," etc. These were counted for each speech sample and 
ratio scores were obtained. 
4. Interrogative Forms: The interrogative form 
consisted of three main groups:· 
a. The first group of questions could be 
answered by a "yes" or a "no." 
b. The second group of questions asked "what ,r' 
"when," "where," "which," "who," ''whose." 
c. The third group of questions asked "how' 
and "why." 
These three groups were count.ed separately in each 
speech sample and the ratio scores fol' the total wel'e obtained. 
D. Results. 
1. Present Tense: this prediction was confirmed. 
The l'atio of present tenses significantly increased in the 
experimental condition. The ~esults were significant at the 
.01 level both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories. 
2. Future Tense: This prediction was confirmed. 
The ratio of future tenses significantly decreased in the ex-
perimental condition. The results were significant at the 
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• 05 level in Conversational Speech and at the .01 level in 
the Stories • 
3· Complicated Tenses: This prediction was con-
firmed. The ratio of complicated tenses significantly de-
creased in the experimental condition. The results were 
significant at the .01 level both in Conversational Speech 
and in the Stories. 
4. Interrogative For.m: This prediction was partly 
confir.med. The ratio of interrogative forms significantly 
decreased at the .01 level in the Stories but no signifi-
cant decrease was noted in Conversational Speech. 
The rationale with regard to the directedness of 
primary-process thinking to the immediate situation was 
experimentall7 demonstrated. 
f!• Sp1cretic Me£hanisms - SJebolic E.;pres,sion 
A. Nul~Hypothesis. The ratio of the number of neo-
logisms to the total number of words used in the experi-
mental condition will be equal to the ratio of the number 
of neologisms to the total number of words used in the 
control condition. 
B. Prediction. The ratio of the number of neologisms 
to the total number of words used in the experimental condi-
tion will be greater than the ratio of the number of neo-
logisms to the total number of words used in the control 
condition. 
c. ~alysis of the data. Neologisms consisted of 
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three groups: 
1. Typical Neologisms: These were new words, 
created by the subject, which coUld not be found in any 
dictionary. Examples obtained in this research are "I 
will kidder her tomorrow •••• " (condensation of "kid11 and 
"tease"), and 
"whore" ) • 
"whorlet" (condensation of "woman" and 
2. Malapropism: These were misues of words. 
Examples are "I drank rrry breakfast" instead of "I ate my 
breakfast," or using "she" instead of 11 he." 
3· Lack of Agreement: These were lack of agree-
ment between tenses, pronouns, etc. Examples are "I has 
an apple" instead of "I have an apple." 
These three types were counted separately for each 
speech sample and the total of the three groups was called 
Neologisms. Ratio scores for the total were obtained. 
D. Results. This prediction was confirmed. The ratio 
of the neologisms increased significantly in the experimental 
condition. The results were significant at the .01 level 
both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories. The 
rationale concerning the syncretic mechanisms employed by 
primary-process thinking leading to its expression in sym-
bolic for.ms was experimentally demonstrated. 
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The number of predictions that were confirmed by each 
subject was tabulated (i.e., the number of measures on 
which the subject's speech changed in the predicted direction}; 
these are presented in Tables 3 and 4. To determine whether 
the average change for the entire group of subjects was sig-
nificant, the Standard Student ! was applied as follows: By 
chance, the average subject's speech would change in the pre-
dicted direction on 8 of the 16 measures. In Conversational 
Speech, the average number of measures on which subjects' 
speech changed in the expected direction was 11.50 and the 
t value of the difference between this and the chance ex-
-
pectancy of 8 was 8.54 (.001 level}. In the Stories, the 
mean was 12.63 and the corresponding ~ value was 9.88 
(.001 level}. Thus, the entire group of subjects showed 
a very significant change in the experimental condition. 
To determine whether a correlation exists between the 
number of changes on the 16 predictions and the amount of 
alcohol consumed, a rank-order correlation was carried out. 
The result of this test showed a non-significant correlation 
of +.10 between the amount of alcohol consumed and the extent 
of change. 
SUmmary of th,e ~sul ts 
In summary, the results of the analysis of the data 
show that the following predictions were significant at 
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least at the .05 level in Both Cases, i.e., both in Con-
versational Speech and in the Stories: First-person pro-
nouns, present tense, complicated tense, expletives, neo-
logisms, poorly organized sentences, conjunctions, future 
tense, type-token ratio and organization of speech. (See 
Table 5.) 
The following predictions were significant at least 
at the .05 level in Conversational Speech: First-person 
pronouns, present tense, complicated tense, expletives, 
neologisas, poorly organized sentences, conjunctions, 
future tense, type-token ratio and organization of speech. 
The following predictions were not significant in 
Conversational Speech: Intensifiers, interrogative form, 
indefinite pronouns, adjectives, adverbs, subjective nouns. 
(See Table 6.) 
The following predictions were significant at least 
at the .05 level in the Stories: First-person pronouns, 
present tense, complic~ted tense, expletives, neologisms, 
poorly organized sentences, conjunctions, future tense, 
type-token ratio, organization of speech, intensifiers, 
interrogative form, adjtctives and adverbs. (See Table 7.) 
The f-:>llowing predictions were not significant in the 
Stories (nor in Conversational Speech): Indefinite pro-
nouns and subjective nouns. 
Table 5 
PREDICTIONS WHICH SHOWED A STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT 
CHANGE IN THE TWO CONDITIONS 
Probabili tyl 
Predictions Conversational Speech Stories 
1 Type-token ratio .o5 .o1 
2 First-person pronouns .01 .01 
5c Expletives .01 .01 
6 Conjunctions .01 .o1 
7a Organization of Speech2 .o5 .01 
7b Poorly organized sentences .01 .o1 
Sa Present tenses .01 .01 
8b Future tenses .05 .01 
8c Complicated tenses .01 .01 
9 Neologisms .01 .01 
1 
One-tailed test of significance by Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
2 
Tbis prediction was tested by the Sign Test. 
Predictions 
1. :" '!ype-token ratio 
~able 6 
CONVERSATIONAL SP.EECH 
2 First-person pronouns 
3 Indefinite Pronouns2 
4a Intensitiers2 
hb Adverba2 
5a Adjectives 2 
5b Subjective nouns 2 
5c Expletives 
6 Conjunctions 
7a Organization of Speech3 
7b Poorly organized sentences 
8a Present tenses 
8b Future tenses 
8c Complicated tenses 2 8d Interrogative forJIS 
9 NeologiSlllS 
1 
1 Wilcoxon Values 
N • 23 
3.38** 
4.18** 
1.99* 
2.45** 
86. 
Tbe values given under this column are the critical ratio values 
for the normal approximation of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
2 
This prediction vas not significant. 
3 
This prediction was tested b;r the Sign Test and was significant 
at the • 05 level. 
* ** p < .o5 (one-tailed) p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Table 7 
STORIES 
Predictions 
1 Type-token ratio 
2 First-person pronouns 
3 Indefinite Pronouns2 
4a Intensifiers 
4b Adverbs 
5a Adjectives 
.5b Subjective nouu2 
5c Expletives 
6 Conjunctions 
7a Organization of speech3 
7b Poorly organized sentences 
8a Present tenses 
8b hture tenses 
8c Complicated tenses 
8d Interrogative forms 
9 Neologisms 
1 
87. 
Wilcoxon Valuesl 
N • 23 
2.90H 
3.94** 
3.35** 
1.9~ 
1.93* 
2.55** 
3.91** 
3.66-H 
3.27** 
3.39** 
3.45** 
2.79** 
4.o6H 
The values given under this column are the critical ratio values 
of the normal approximation of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
2 
This prediction was not significant. 
3 
This prediction was tested by the Sign Test and was significant 
at the .ol level. 
* ** p < .o5 (one-tailed) p < .01 (one-tailed) 
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The three groups which dirfered in experimental treat-
ment were compared with respect to average number of changes 
per subject in the expected direction. Since the three 
groups changed in the expected direction with about the 
same average frequency both in Conversational Speech and in 
the Stories, they were treated as one group. 
The results or the ! test applied to determine whether 
the average change ror the entire group of subjects was sig-
nificant, showed a very significant change ror the entire 
group or subjects in the experimental condition. 
The rank-order correlation carried out on the amount 
or alcohol consumed and the extent of change in the ex-
perimental condition was not signiricant. 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
This study, formulated within the framework of psy-
choanalytic theory, investigated the grammatical st.ructure 
of primary-process thinking, in a state of weakened ego con-
trols, brought about by alcohol intoxication. Analysis of 
the results, in general, support the hypothesis that the 
grammatical structure of language is of a different kind in 
this state of weakened ego controls. 
On the basis of the rationale derived from psycho-
analytic theory, sixteen predictions were made in relation 
to the grammatical structure of primary-process t~ing as 
expressed in speech. In the state of weakened ego controls, 
the following changes in the grammatical structure of speech 
were observed: Language became more repetitive. First-
person pronouns, present tenses, expletives, and neologisms 
increased. Conjunctions, future and complicated tenses de-
creased. Sentences were poorly organized and speech was 
disorderly. There were also strong tendencies toward more 
frequent use of adjectives and less frequent use of adverbs, 
intensifiers and interrogative forms. 
The results demonstrated that most of the characteris-
tics of primary-process thinking are reflected in the gram-
matical structure of language under conditions of weakened 
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ego controls. It was shown that the autistic, affective 
characteristics of primary-process thinking, as well as its 
directedness to the immediate situation, its disorganization, 
fragmentation, lack of logical, causal, temporal or spatial 
organization, can be noted in the grammatical structure of 
speech. The results of the research also showed that the 
syncretic mechanisms employed in ideation and their mani-
festation in thought or speech in symbolic forms can be ob-
served in language behavior. The failure of ideation to 
qualify or quantify the world of events, thoughts, or feel-
ings also tends to be .reflected in the use or certain words. 
Thus, a new area of investigation is opened to workers in-
terested in the study of the manifestations of the primary 
processes. 
Although the results of the research demonstrate that, 
a~der this state of weakened ego controls, most of the char-
acteristics of primary-p.rocess thinking can be detected in 
the grammatical structure of speech, certain predictions were 
not confirmed: The use of indefinite pronouns and subjective 
nouns did not change in the expected direction and the sub-
jective adjectives showed inconsistent changes. Examination 
of the results also shows that there were differences be~veen 
the two kinds of speech samples: The Stories, in general, 
showed greater change than Conversational Speech. The fail-
ure to confirm the two predictions, the inconsistent results 
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obtained on the use of adjectives, and the differences be-
tween the two kinds of speech samples require explanation. 
On the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of thinking, 
it was expected that the frequent use of adjectives, sub-
jective nouns, and expletives in a state of werutened ego con-
trols would reveal the fusion of affect with thought in 
primary-process thinking, leading to subjectivity in cogni-
tive processes. This characteristic of ideation was re-
f.lected in the use of expletives, which showed a significant 
increase both in Conversational Speech and the Stories. 
Adjectives showed a significant increase in the Stories but 
not in Conversational Speech. SUbjective nouns, on the 
other hand, failed to confir.m the rationale: They showed 
a non-significant increase in the Stories and a non-
significant decrease in Conversational Speech. 
On the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of thinking, 
it was also hypothesized that the use of indefinite pronouns 
would increase in a state of weakened ego controls. These 
grammatical for.ms were expected to reveal the diffuseness 
and lack of differentiation of primary-process thinking. 
The results of the research showed, however, that the inde-
finite pronouns showed a change in the opposite direction, 
i.e., both in Conversational Speech and in the Stories, the 
use of indefinite pronouns decreased, although this dec.rease 
was not significant. 
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The inconsistent results obtained for adjectives and 
the lack of confirmation of the hypotheses pertaining to 
subjective nouns and indefinite pronouns are first to be 
explained in terms of the nature of the rationale on which 
these specific predictions were based. It should be pointed 
out that the fusion of affect with thought in ideation as 
well as its diffuseness and lack of differentiation, as ex-
plained by Freud and Rapaport, refer to the characteristics 
of a developmental stage which is difficult or impossible 
to obtain under experimental conditions. In order to be 
able to demonstrate these characteristics of primary-process 
thinking, a very severe regression to the most primitive 
modes of functioning is required, 't-Thich expe.rimental pro-
cedures fail to accomplish. Even if it had been possible 
to create such a state experimentally, it is most unlikely 
that these specific characteristics of primary-process th~­
ing would be directly observed in language behavior, par-
ticularly in its grammatical structure. In such a regressed 
state, an individual is apt to employ the most primitive 
modes of expression, such as motor discharge, and is un-
likely to use language as the means for expressing his needs. 
Secondly, the nature of the experimental method needs 
to be considered. In the state of weakened ego controls 
brought about by alcohol intoxication, many changes in the 
grammatical structure of language occur which confirm the 
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theoretical formulations made with regard to the grammatical 
structure of primary-process thinking, so that there is con-
siderable evidence to support the hypothesis that this state 
makes it possible to demonstrate some characteristics of the 
primary processes. However, alcohol intoxication, as is the 
case with any other experimental method, may not be the ideal 
experimental procedure to create a state in which all the 
characteristics of the primary processes can be observed. 
The condition obtained in alcohol intoxication is one of 
moderate regression to primitive modes of functioning and 
thinking; thus this experimental procedure would not have 
created that severe state of regression in which the most 
primitive characteristics of ideation may be studied- e.g., 
diffuseness, lack of differentiation. It is a fact that no 
pure primary process can be produced under any experimental 
conditions. The secondary processes are observed even in 
the most acutely regressed psychotic patient. Since the 
regression brought about by alcohol intoxication is not a 
severe one, secondary-process thinking, although handi-
capped in many ways, is often consciously summoned to the 
aid of the ego. Even the most acutely intoxicated subject 
is sometimes fully aware of his behavior, and in case of 
threat, anxiety, or urgent realistic demands, exerts a con-
scious control over his thought, feelings, and actions. 
However, such controls require an excessive expenditure of 
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energy and are of short duration. 
The primary processes can be investigated in various 
states of weakened ego controls, such as dreams, extreme 
fatigue, sensory deprivation and psychosis. Since this re-
search is the first attempt made to investigate the gram-
matical structure of primary-process thinking, it is sug-
gested that the results of the study be confirmed by others 
which have the same purpose but employ different experimental 
conditions of weakened ego controls. 
Thirdly, the failure to confirm certain predictions 
through this research can also be attributed to the nature 
of the predictions. It is probable that subjective nouns 
are not the grammatical forms to show the tendency towards 
subjectivity. Possibly other factors play a part in their 
choice in language. The same point can be raised for the 
indefinite pronouns. In the first place, the high degree 
of egocentricity created in the subjects by alcohol intoxi-
cation leads to such a heavy emphasis on first-person pro-
nouns that the indefinite pronouns rarely occur. Secondly, 
it may be that indefinite pronouns as grammatical structures 
do not express diffuseness and lack of differentiation as 
hypothesized. As was pointed out previously, these charac-
teristics of primary-process thinking occur at a very early 
stage of development, during which no differentiation exists 
between the self and the external world. The use of indefinite 
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pronouns, on the other hand, implies an awareness of spe-
cific and unspecific objects in external reality. There-
fore it is doubtful that they would be the grammatical 
forms to represent the tendency to diffuseness and lack of 
differentiation. 
A fourth possibility can also be offered to explain 
the inconsistent results obtained from adjectives and fail-
ure to confirm these two predictions: It is probable that 
a psychological characteristic manifests itself not in one 
but in a variety of measures. For example, Zipf 1 s type-
token ratio (disturbance in the equilibrium between diver-
sification and repetitiveness) has been used in other re-
searches not only to detect disturbance in social communi-
cation, but also to measure the degree of diffuseness and 
lack of differentiation in a speech sample. By being too 
repetitive and by avoiding the use of a va.riety of words, 
an individual tends towards homogeneity of expression. His 
speech is not elaborated and therefore is not as clear as 
the speech of someone who uses a greater variety of words 
so as to make finer and more precise differentiations among 
the ideas he presents to his listener. 
The significant change towards repetitiveness observed 
in the type-token ratios of the subjects used in this ex-
periment shows that in states of weakened ego controls speech 
is not as elaborated and differentiated as it is under nor.mal 
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conditions. This, perhaps, points to the fact that primary-
process thinking tends to be undifferentiated when expressed 
in speech, and that this tendency is better observed in 
disturbance in the equilibrium between diversification and 
repetitiveness. 
The same can be said about adjectives. Post hoc, one 
could argue that adjectives do not, per se, represent the 
expression of affect and that other grammatical for.ms as 
well (like expletives, verbs) are used as a means of ex-
pressing feelings, thus decreasing the tendency to express 
affect through adjectives. Since expletives show a signi-
ficant change in both Conversational Speech and in the 
Stories, the hypothesis pertaining to the fusion of affect 
with thought in pr~ary-process thinking still seems to be 
supported. 
The results of this research also showed differences 
between the two kinds of speech samples. In both the normal 
state and the state of weakened ego controls, two kinds of 
speech samples were obtained, Conversational Speech and 
Stories. An examination of the results shows that the 
Stories gave results mo.re closely conforming to expectations. 
Ten predictions were significant in the state of intoxica-
tion in Conversational Speech, whereas in the Stories, four-
teen predictions were significant. 
The difference between these two types of speech 
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samples can perhaps be explained in terms of the nature of 
the experimental situation, the attitudes brought into it by 
the subjects, and the nature of the task itself. In the 
Conversational Speech situation in non-intoxication, a 
casual conversation was carried out between the subject and 
the examiner, and the examiner tried to make the situation as 
comfortable as possible for the subject. However, no matter 
how much assurance was given to the subjects, they often ex-
pressed considerable anxiety and discomfort over this situa-
tion. Being a subject in an experiment in which large quan-
tities of alcohol are to be consumed often created anxiety 
in the subjects and misconceptions were built up that the aim 
of the experiment was to discover how much alcohol one could 
tolerate, or how "crazy" one acted under alcohol. When sub-
jects also knew that the examiner was a psychologist, they 
misperceived the conversation as an analytical inquiry and 
tended to be either quite defensive, or inhibited and with-
drawn during this time. It is possible that these miscon-
ceptions and anxieties prevented the subjects from talking 
in their usual manner, and thus affected the grammatical 
structure of their speech in the state of non-intoxication. 
vlhen the task of "telling a story about the pictures" was 
presented to the subject, relief was often observed because 
the emphasis was removed from the subject's self to a set of 
pictures. The subject found it much easier to make up 
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stories about pictures than to carry on a rather personal 
conversation with a psychologist. Even in the state of 
intoxication, some subjects felt relieved and expressed 
this feeling when the conversation ended and the pictures 
were presented. 
When the intoxicated subject was asked to come to the 
interview room for his experimental speech sample a differ-
ent type of anxiety was manifested. This time, some subjects 
(mostly males) feared that they were "terribly drunk" and 
did not possess their usual composure and self-control. It 
also created considerable discomfort in these subjects to 
be interviewed by a "sober female psychologist" when they 
themselves were highly intoxicated. Often conscious attempts 
were made to speak clearly and coherently; elaborate, verbose 
sentences and phrases were used. Thus attempts were made to 
convey to the examiner the impression that they we.re "only 
slightly high." These subjects often tried to prove their 
sobreity by being aggressive and by bombarding the examiner 
with questions as to the nature of the experin1ent. Such 
questions were rarely asked in the conversation carried on 
in the state of non-intoxication, because then the subjects 
had the conception that they were there to tell a story and 
take a test. Although the directions specified that they 
could ask questions whenever they wished, the subjects re-
frained from doing so, and if they were exceptionally 
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curious, asked questions after the whole speech sample was 
obtained and the recording machine turned off. This is re-
flected in part in the fact that the interrogative forms do 
not decrease but show a non-significant increase in Con-
versational Speech. 
Some subjects, mostly females, had a different atti-
tude toward the experimental condition. Although they, too, 
experienced the above-mentioned anxieties and misconceptions 
in the state or non-intoxication, in general, they tended to 
deal with their anxieties by withdrawal and inhibition. 
\l:hen they were interv:i.ewed in the state of intoxication, 
with the influence or alcohol and the resulting weakening 
of controls they felt more relaxed and comfortable with the 
examiner •. They felt freer in questioning her about the 
nature of the experiment, which they did not dare to do in 
the conversation carried out in the state of non-intoxication. 
Thus in these subjects too, the interrogative forms tend to 
increase in Conversational Speech obtained in the state of 
intoxication (Subjects 2, 3, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22). These sub-
jects, if they asked questions when they were telling stories, 
did so to demand help and support from the examiner, whereas 
the first type of subject, in the Stories, continued to ques-
tion the validity of the test material or the experimental 
set-up. It should also be noted, however, that it was 
easier ~or the ~emale subject to ~eel relaxed with the 
examiner in the state o~ intoxication. 
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Entering the state o~ intoxication with different 
attitudes, the first type of subject (mostly males) tried, 
during the conversation period, to convince the examiner he 
was "only slightly high," whereas the second type of sub-
ject, eager to please the examiner, emphasized the fact that 
he was a "very good subject because he was so drunk." 
These subjects also talked about how "dizzy and terribly 
sick" they felt. 
Emphasizing the extent and the nature of their 
sobreity, dizziness, sickness, etc. (although with differ-
ent motivations behind it), tended to create little or no 
change in the number of intensifiers and adverbs in Con-
versational Speech in the state of intoxication. When the 
structured situation o~ "story telling" was presented to 
them, the subjects no longer felt the need to convince the 
examiner; the emphasis shifted again ~rom their person to 
the cards and they started telling stories with little 
qualification, quantification, or specification. This re-
sulted in significant scores for intensifiers and adverbs 
in the Stories but not in Conve.rsational Speech. 
It is also true that Conversational Speech and the 
Stories are different types of language behavior. The 
former is less structured, and the subject usually requires 
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·considerable help from the examiner to carry on a continuous 
conversation. Although the examiner put forth questions 
which allowed the subject to talk about certain topics, it 
was up to the subj~ct to elaborate them. Subjects did not 
talk freely, and as soon as they answered the qilestion, they 
turned to the examiner for further inquiry. In the Stories, 
on the other hand, structured TAT directions are given and 
the subjects produce some kind of speech with some amount 
of continuity. Thus, grammatical forms play different roles 
in the two speech samples because of the differences in the 
nature of the language behavior itself. The speech samples 
obtained in the conversation situation are not similar in 
their structures and elements to the ones obtained in the 
St•ries. The former are often shorter and do not include a 
variety of grammatical forms. Even if they do, they are not 
used consistently, whereas the Stories, being longer and 
more continuous in general, initiate the use of all kinds of 
grammatical forms. Thus changes in the frequency of their 
occurrence are more obvious. The different results obtained 
from the Conversational Speech and the Stories can also be 
due to the greater effect of alcohol in time lapse. 
This explanation clarifies the different results obtained 
from the two kinds of speech samples and explains why in 
Bonversational Speech the interrogative forms show a non-
significant increase lrather than the predicted decreasej and 
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the intensifiers and adverbs show the predicted but non-
significant decrease. It thus offers an explanation for the 
difference in results obtained from the Stories and Conver-
sational Speech. 
In conclusion, it ean be reported that this attempt to 
study the gra1nmatical structure of language beha·~rior in alco-
hol intoxication has given fruitful evidence that the gramma-
tical structure of speech is of a different kind in states 
of weakened ego controls. The changes observed corroborate 
in most respects the theoret:5.cal formula~ions made on the 
grammatical structure of primary-process thinking. They are 
now open to confirmation by further studies. 
The research also offers some evidence that individuals 
vary not only in their normal language behavior, as has been 
pointed out by numerous workers, but that they also show in-
dividual differences in the manifestations of primary-precess 
thinking in the grammatical structure of their speech. The 
data suggest that sex-linked differences exist and that per-
sonality factors play an important role in the choice of 
grammatical forms in a state of weakened ego controls. Since 
no attempt was made in this research to study such individual 
variations, the investigation of the relationship between 
personality types, characteristics, sexual differences and 
the grammatical structure of language used in states dominated 
by the primary processes is also left open for future inves-
tigation. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY 
The aim of this research was to investigate the gram-
matical structure of primary-process thinking as expressed 
in speech. It was formulated within the framevrork of psy-
choanalytic theory, and was specifically based on F.reud' s 
and Rapaport's writings on cognition. 
Psychoanalytic theory differentiates between two types 
of thought: Primary-process thinking (ideation) and 
secondary-process thinking (tlwught). Ideation is con-
ceptualized as a hallucinatory wish-fulfillment that occurs 
when, due to the absence of the need-satisfying object, the 
cathexis is directed to the memory image of the object which 
in the past provided the reduction of this need. It is 
characterized as being autistic, egocentric, and affect-
laden. It is oriented to the immediate present, and does 
not consider past experiences or future possibilities. It 
lacks spatial, temporal, and causal organization, does not 
concern itself with the relations of time and space, and 
fails to make a definite estimation or evaluation of events 
and external reality. It is undifferentiated, diffuse and 
vague. Since it abides by syncretic mechanisms, its ex-
pression in language is in symbolic forms unique to the in-
dividual. Ideation is also conceptualized as being 
lOJ 
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fragmented and disorganized when expressed in speech. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, the primary pro-
cesses can be observed in states of weakened ego controls 
such as dreams, neurosis, psychosis and the underdeveloped 
state of infancy. Infancy facilitates hallucinatory wish-
fulfillment because of the absence of and/or immaturity of 
the ego. 
It was hypothesized that these characteristics of 
ideation are expressed in the grammatical structure of 
language. Studies carried out on the language behavior of 
neurotics, psychotics, and children were reviewed. The 
literature dealing with the relationship between certain 
grammatical forms and personality types or characteristics 
was also studied. On the basis of Freud's and Rapaport's 
formulations on primary-process thinking and the various 
studies of language behavior, the following sixteen pre-
dictions were made about the grammatical structure of 
ideation: 
The autistic characteristic of ideation was expected 
to be revealed in the type-token ratio - a measure devised 
to test the disturbance in the equilibrium between diversi-
fication and repetitiveness in speech. The egocentricity of 
ideation was expected to be revealed in the increased use of 
first-person pronouns. The frequent use of indefinite pro-
nouns was hypothesized to represent the diffuseness and lack 
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or differentiation of primar7-process thinking. The failure 
or such thinking to qualify and quantir7 the worlds of 
events, thoughts, and feelings was expected to manifest it-
self in the decreased use of intensifiers and adverbs. 
Since in primary-process thinking afrect is fused with 
thought and thus cognitive processes tend to be subjective, 
it was expected that the use of adjectives, subjective nouns, 
and expletives would increase. A decrease in the use of 
conjunctions was hypothesized as representing the lack of 
logical, causal, temporal, or spatial organization or idea-
tion. Because of the lack of such organization, the ex-
pression of primary-process thinking in speech is often 
fragmented and disorganized. These characteristics were 
expected to reveal themselves in the use of poorly organized 
sentences and in the disorganization of the total speech 
sample. Ideation is also characterized as directed to the 
immediate situation; thus it was hypothesized that. the use 
of the present tense would increase and of the future tense, 
complicated tenses, and interrogative forms would decrease. 
Since primary-process thinking emplo7s syncretic mechanisms 
and expresses itself in speech through symbolic forms, it 
was expected that the number of neologisms would increase. 
Alcohol intoxication was used as the means of bringing 
about the state of weakened ego controls. 
gories of the independent variable were: 
The two cate-
(1) State of non-
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intoxication; and (2) State of intoxication. The dependent 
variable was the grammar of speech samples in the two states. 
Twenty-three nor.mal adult male and female subjects, 
who were occasional and moderate drinkers, were used. The 
experiment was carried on in the experimental laboratory of 
the Butler Health Center in Providence, Rhode Island. The 
speech of the subjects was recorded on a machine in an in-
terview room in the state of non-intoxication and in the 
state of intoxication. The speech samples were of two 
kinds: (a) Conversational Speech, consisting of a casual 
conversation between the examiner and the subject; and (b) 
Stories, consisting of reactions to three TAT cards and two 
colored surrealistic pictures. 
The subjects we.re divided into three groups in random 
order: Speech samples were obtained from the first group 
of subjects in the state of non-intoxication followed by 
the state of intoxication. With the second group of sub-
jects, the speech samples in the state of non-intoxication 
were obtained a few days after the experiment. In the third 
group of subjects, order of presentation of the TAT cards 
and the pictures was reversed. 
Tue speech samples were analyzed in terms of the six-
teen predictions. In order to rule out any differences due 
to the order of conditions, the three groups which differed 
in experimental treatment were compared with respect to the 
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average number of changes per subject in the expected 
direction. It was noted that the three groups did not 
significantly differ; thereafter they were treated as one 
group. 
The .results of the analysis of the data showed that 
the grammatical structure of speech significantly changes 
in the state of weakened ego controls brought about by 
alcohol intoxication. 
Of the 16 predictions, in Conversational Speech 10 
predictions showed a significant change in the experimental 
condition. These were the following: Present tense, 
first-person pronouns, neologisms, expletives increased. 
Conjunctions, complicated and future tenses decreased. The 
use of poorly organized sentences increased. The organi-
zation of the total speech sample became poor. There was a 
tendency towards repetitiveness in the use of words. These 
changes were significant at the .o5 level or better by the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
The Stories, in general, gave better results. Of the 
16 predictions, 14 showed a significant change in the ex-
perimental condition. In addition to the changes obtained 
in Conversational Speech, in the Stories, intensifiers, ad-
verbs, and interrogative forms decreased and adjectives in-
creased. These changes were significant at the .05 level 
or better by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
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The indefinite pronouns showed a non-significant change 
in the opposite direction. Both in Conversational Speech 
and in the Stories, there was a non-significant decrease in 
their use, instead of the predicted increase. The sub-
jective nouns showed a non-significant decrease in Conversa-
tional Speech and a non-significant increase in the Stories. 
The application of the Student ! to the data showed 
that the average change for the entire group of subjects 
was highly significant both in Conversational Speech (~ = 8.54) 
and in the Stories (~ = 9.88). 
No significant correlation was observed between the 
degree of intoxication and the amount of change in the 
grammatical structure of speech. 
The inconsistent results obtained from adjectives and 
the failure to confirm the hypotheses with regard to indefi-
nite pronouns and subjective nouns were explained in the fol-
lowing manner: It was first suggested that the characteris-
tics of ideation, namely, affective quality, diffuseness, and 
lack of differentiation, may not be manifested in the gram-
matical structure of speech. A second possibility was sug-
gested, which conce.rned the limitations of any experimental 
method in bringing about the state of severe weakening of ego 
controls required to investigate freely all the characteris-
tics of primary processes. Thirdly, these specific gram-
matical forms may not be the appropriate ones to represent 
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the mentioned characteristics of ideation. The fourth sug-
gestion was that such characteristics of primary-process 
thinking could have been reflected in other grammatical forms. 
The better results obtained from the Stories in rela-
tion to interrogative for.ms, adverbs, and intensifiers were 
explained in terms of the attitudes of the subjects towards 
the two conditions. It was pointed out that the subjects 
brought into the experimental situation their anxieties and 
misconceptions about the nature and purpose of the experi-
ment. During the conversational period of non-intoxication, 
the male subjects tended to be defensive and the females in-
hibited and withdrawn. During the state of intoxication, the 
male subjects attempted to control their intoxication and 
the females were too eager to please the examiner. These 
personality factors and anxieties manifested thamselves in 
the use of the grammatical forms: The interrogative for.ms, 
intensifiers, and adverbs did not show a significant dec.rease 
in Conversational Speech. 
The difference between the two kinds of speech samples 
was also attributed to the nature of the situation. It was 
explained that conversational speech and making up stories 
differ in their structures and elements as language be-
haviors, and that different grammatical forms play differ.ent 
roles in the two conditions. 
It was concluded that in a state of weakened ego 
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controls primary-process thinking expresses itself in 
speech through a different grammatical structure. It was 
suggested that the results obtained through this research 
be confirmed in other states of experimentally produced 
weakened ego controls. Since the data offered some possi-
bilities with regard to the relationship between the mani-
festations of primary-process thinking in grwmmatical forms 
and personality characteristics, it was suggested that this 
area be investigated. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMATION ABOUT SUBJECTS 
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INFORMATION ABOUT ~ 
Subject ~ Sex 
-
F.4ucation Oceupat±on Marital state Health 
1 35 F B.S. Retail buyer s Good 
2 44 F Nurse Housewife M Good 
3 32 F B.S. Housewife M Good 
~ 22 F Nurse Nurse s Good 
5 3~ F M.S. Nurse divorced Good 
6 ~1 M Ph.D. Professor M Excellent 
7 36 M B.A. Advertiser s Excellent 
8 36 M u .• s .• IJlstructor M Excellent 
9 31 M B.A. P.O.* M Good 
10 25 M student student s Excellent 
ll 32 F M.A. P.O. M Excellent 
12 39 F M .• A. Teacher M Good 
13 25 M B.A. Student s Excellent 
14 34 M Ph.D. Professor M Good 
15 32 M B.S. P.O. divorced Good 
16 35 F B.S .• O.T. ** M Good 
17 39 M B.S. Secretary M Excellent 
18 32 M Ph.D. Professor M Excellent 
19 23 F R.N. Jurse s Eltcellent 
20 2At. M A..B. Med. student s Excellent 
21 25 F A.B. Teacher s Excellent 
22 20 F Nurse Nurse s Good 
23 ~ M Ph.D. Psychologist M Excellent 
* Participant Observer 
**Occupational Therapist 
APP.ENDIX B 
RATIO SCORES OF THE SUBJECTS ON THE 16 
PREDICTIONS IN CONVERSATIONAL SPEECH 
AND STORIES 
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ASOCIABILI'l'r AID AUTISM 
~e-Token Ratio 
1 
Conversational S,peeCh Stories 
SubJect Control Experimental Control Experimental 
1 .36630 ·55555 -36539 .34697 
2 -39410 -32787 -341189 .25508 
3 .36674 -33182 -34676 .26325 
4 .43132 .30459 -31R>49 .25025 
5 ·37100 .28593 -341186 -32700 6 
-33576 .29281 .361ll .286o7 
7 .45ll8 -56557 -32987 .27556 
8 
-32051 .31226 ·35192 .21R>76 
9 .49482 .)f2li7 ·36496 .36470 
10 .1R>657 .281R>4 .26431 .23843 
ll .36232 ·35906 -31000 .26506 
12 .43625 .36881 -31519 .27069 
13 .47229 .27415 -33896 .32454 
14 .46185 .41043 .34554 -35736 
15 .48478 .45867 ·35423 -35551 
16 .1R>025 .38889 -34733 .32410 
17 .43193 .1R>l62 ·33698 ·33379 
18 ·33149 -54382 -3101R> .29()69 
19 .41692 -30769 .29743 ·30271 
20 .38143 .38444 .25471 .27376 
21 .43389 .42992 .30322 .41070 
22 .38388 ·37857 .30417 .27735 
23 .41250 .44163 -32545 .28500 
115. 
:mocEN'miCITY 
First-Person Pronouns 
2 
Conversational Speech Stories 
Subject Control Experimental Control Experimental 
1 .o8655 -19157 .04ol3 .0921!2 
2 .08700 -15300 .05990 .09050 
3 .05650 .10152 .04316 .09337 
4 .o8433 .16475 .04666 .03850 
5 .07500 -15310 .04717 .07900 
6 .06533 .08208 .05769 .09341 
7 .olt882 .05738 .01598 .024o5 
8 .06500 .1762o .03650 .12250 
9 .121!20 .1756o .03298 .08921 
10 .08304 .13617 .03703 .05551 
11 .07727 .14185 .04415 .03678 
12 .09561 .13761 .05031 .06261 
13 .09123 .15363 .02441 .03144 
14 .09980 .11565 .03185 .04o75 
15 .08196 .11570 .02310 .03674 
16 .06353 .11616 .03413 .06161 
17 .07395 .12170 .026o3 .o6661 
18 .05502 .04825 .05120 .05556 
19 .06897 .18737 .02564 .06598 
20 .101!28 .16ooo .03014 .04681 
21 .1034o .15605 .06544 .0766o 
22 .05845 .o6667 .04166 .05316 
23 .02272 .Og-(27 .04o91 .05800 
116. 
DIFFUSENESS AND LACK OF DIFFEREN!'IATION 
Indefinite Pronouns 
3 
Conversational Speech Stories 
SubJ·ect Control· - - Eltp'ertment&t Control .. •Experilnental' 
1 .05255 .o6513 .05913 .05000 
2 .oo447 .o64o8 .07216 .05418 
3 .05330 .o4091 .o6218 .o6024 
4 .05542 .05938 .08448 .1074o 
5 .o4200 .03631 .o4717 .05100 
6 .o6553 .02605 .o6410 .05838 
7 .05029 .o4918 .05921 .o4709 
8 .o6500 .o4981 .08215 .08299 
9 .o4762 .o4955 .05876 .07451 
10 .05882 .o6170 .o6229 .05836 
11 .05072 .o6lo4 .07359 .o6280 
12 .05378 .o4771 .07187 .o6486 
13 .03o41 .o46oo .05352 .o6288 
14 .05479 .02721 .05573 .o4807 
15 .05621 .03099 .o8471 .o6256 
16 .05210 .o6313 .07786 .08571 
17 .o47o6 .07302 .05616 .05779 
18 .o6878 .03070 .07280 .o4910 
19 .05172 .o4931 .o6007 .08667 
20 .o6857 .05778 .07308 .06383 
21 .o4746 .07oo6 .07834 .o4468 
22 .08215 .o6667 .07833 .08320 
23 .o4772 .03697 .o6455 .074oo 
117. 
LACK OF QUALIFICATION AND QU.ABTIFICATIOB 
Intensifiers 
4a 
Conversational SPeech Stories 
Subject Control Ex;perimental Control 
--
Experimental 
1 .02150 .03443 .03380 .01365 
2 .02635 .01639 .01218 .01580 
3 .00746 .02424 .02414 .02161 
4 .03373 .02682 .01765 .01824 
5 .01900 .02269 .01782 .01000 
6 .01537 .00789 .02777 .00584 
7 .01923 .09016 .02914 .028o5 
8 .02846 .Oll49 .03245 .02136 
9 .02277 .02027 .03000 .02843 
10 .01554 .oo851 .01342 0 
ll .01449 .01616 .02251 .01303 
12 .02390 .02018 .02259 .02237 
13 .01252 .ouo4 .02817 .01420 
14 .00783 .02041 .01911 .01567 
15 .00937 .02479 .01650 .Oll92 
16 .02414 .00758 .02008 .01964 
17 .03866 .01420 .02739 .02lto7 
18 .01100 .00877 .Ol04o .01550 
19 .01881 .01578 .03004 .02846 
20 .01714 .02444 .04220 .01702 
21 .03389 .02229 .04147 .02552 
22 .02212 .01191 .01500 .01309 
23 .03295 .02llto .03273 .02300 
118. 
LACK OF QUALIFICATION .AID QUA:NTIFICATIOK 
Adverbs 
4b 
Conversational S,peeCh S,peech 
SubJect Control :Ex,perimental Control :Ex.Perimental 
1 .07264 .01916 .02323 .02727 
2 .ou44 .02086 .01499 .Oll30 
3 .00959 .00909 .00366 .00362 
4 .00723 .03065 .01639 .01013 
5 .o2qoo .01059 .02515 .00900 
6 ' .01214 .00789 .Oll75 .00584 
7 .02218 .01639 .02444 .00902 
8 .02656 .01724 .05375 .00515 
9 .01035 .oo676 .01030 .oo588 
10 .00519 .02021 .02104 .oo641 
ll .00725 .03950 .02684 .02298 
l2 .00596 .Ol284 .00513 .00336 
13 .01252 .ou96 .01596 .00~6 
14 .00783 .02494 .02866 .Oll49 
15 .Oll71 .03099 .01210 .01092 
16 .0~66 .02020 .028oo .02232 
17 .03361 .02231 .02945 .04976 
18 .01376 .01316 .01~ .03230 
19 .02665 .04734 .Ola029 .02199 
20 .01714 .06667 .01809 .02553 
21 .03389 .05096 .04147 .05145 
22 .o~65 .01667 .03917 .02234 
23 .03295 .01946 .03091 .01700 
119. 
FUSION OF AFFECT WITH THOOOHT - SUl3J'EX::'1'IV 
Sub ,teet' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Adjectives 
5a 
Conversational Speech 
Control 
.01391 
.o4238 
.02026 
.02169 
.05700 
.o4935 
.03994 
.05952 
.01863 
.07612 
.01691 
.02968 
.03757 
.o4700 
.09368 
.o6226 
.09244 
.05915 
.08495 
.07000 
.o6102 
.o6477 
.08159 
· · - -Exgerilllental 
.08812 
.02086 
.03333 
.00192 
.o6501 
.o6788 
.09836 
.o4215 
.o4546 
.02947 
.08438 
.02752 
.03128 
.o4762 
.095o4 
.07071 
.o6085 
.07895 
.03550 
.o6ooo 
.07643 
.o4524 
.o6031 
Stories 
Control - - ·E!cperimental 
.07920 .08030 
.o44o5 .03725 
.03877 .o4819 
.01513 .01519 
.05346 .054oo 
.05224 .o6422 
.07143 .12120 
.o6288 .03288 
.07217 .10000 
.03620 .o4057 
.05195 .o4291 
.o4723 .o4139 
.o4038 .05071 
.05653 .05956 
.o660l .08540 
.o6212 .08661 
.05890 .07945 
.05360 .o6137 
.o6154 .o6339 
.05501 .05603 
.03318 .o4681 
.05417 .05547 
.07272 .o4100 
FUSION OF .AF'FIDr WITH THOUGHT - SUBJ:ro!'IVITY 
Sub' ,teet 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Subjective Nouns 
Conversational Speech 
Control 
.oo461 
.01480 
.01493 
.01446 
.01700 
.01700 
.03254 
.01923 
.03lo6 
.00173 
0 
.00199 
.00358 
.01370 
.09836 
.033o4 
.03529 
.07290 
.03448 
.o4285 
.03220 
.o4423 
.09772 
.00383 
.oo891&-
.0l364 
.00575 
.o4539 
.oo631 
.03279 
.01149 
.02252 
.01702 
.01794 
0 
.01472 
.01814 
.05578 
.02273 
.02637 
.03509 
.o4537 
.02222 
.o6368 
.14<>47 
.Q2724 
120. 
stories 
Control - · <Experimental' 
.01478 .02879 
.01781 .oo677 
.00212 .00362 
.01387 .02533 
.03983 .03000 
.02885 .03503 
.02820 .03207 
.02536 .01808 
.03505 .o4118 
.02778 .00996 
.00346 .o4521 
.00719 .oo447 
.01596 .01826 
.01990 .02821 
.lllll .09335 
.03150 .o4196 
.o6644 .03852 
.0704o .o6331 
.o4029 .o4787 
.o4973 .03901 
.03871 .03617 
.o6167 .01618 
.11273 .11500 
121. 
FUSION OF AFFECT WITH THOUGBT - SUBJOC'TIVITY 
~ 
5c 
Conversational Speech stories 
SubJect Control·· Experimental Control ·Experimental 
1 .01082 .02798 .oo634 .02121 
2 .00144 .01341 .oo656 .01354 
3 .01493 .oo666 .oo439 .01024 
4 .o4o96 .02682 .01639 .01317 
5 .01000 .00303 .00315 .00700 
6 .02023 .01105 .02564 .02335 
7 .01035 .05738 .01410 .00902 
8 .00920 .02874 .01420 .02301 
9 .01656 .02252 .00309 .01471 
10 .01903 .01383 .oo673 .00925 
11 .oo845 0 .00346 .00153 
12 .01793 .o44o4 .02464 .02908 
13 .01252 .01380 .00938 .00812 
14 .02348 .05669 .01115 .02089 
15 .00703 .00826 .00770 .01092 
16 .01525 .02778 .01225 .03214 
17 .01177 .o6o85 .00890 .01124 
18 .03714 .o614o .o408o .02390 
19 .02038 .03945 .01538 .01941 
20 .02143 .01778 .012o6 .01631 
21 .01525 .01592 .00829 .01277 
22 .ouo6 .03095 .01250 .01002 
23 .017o4 .03697 .01364 .o48oo 
122. 
LACK OF LOGICAL, CAUSAL, TEMPORAL OR SPATIAL 
ORGANIZATION 
Conjunctions 
6 
Conversational SpeeCh Stories 
Subject Control Experimental Control Experimental 
1 .07110 .04981 .08870 .05303 
2 .08700 .05900 .05811 .04966 
3 .104118 .06364 .0721!2 .05241 
4 .05Q6o .07088 .07692 .06383 
5 .07100 .06657 .07233 .o46oo 
6 .06796 .Q7814 .05877 .03753 
7 .10059 .olfo98 .06570 .06212 
8 .05493 .04981 .04159 .04108 
9 .05797 .05630 .07113 .06471 
10 .o61Jo1 .03191 .056lfo .05196 
11 .o8333 .05207 .07273 .07586 
12 .05378 .05872 .07392 .o66oo 
13 .o6o82 .o4968 .06855 .04868 
14 .04305 •. 05442 .06927 .05329 
15 .05854 .05785 .07681 .05263 
16 .o8132 .03283 .07874 .04911 
17 .05882 .05679 .06233 .05297 
18 .01!264 .03509 .0376o .Olfoo5 
19 .07367 .05720 .06886 .05433 
20 .06857 .04889 .o871!2 .06241 
21 .04746 .01592 .041!24 .01277 
22 .06161 .05952 .05750 .05624 
23 .08284 .o8171 .o89Q9 .04300 
123. 
DISORGANIZATION AID FRAGMENTATION 
Organization of S,peech 
7a 
Conversational B,peech Stories 
Subject Control Experimental Control Experimental 
1 + + 
2 + + 
3 + + 
4 + + + 
5 + + 
6 + + 
7 + + 
8 + + 
9 + + + 
10 + + 
11 + + + + 
12 + + 
13 + + + 
14 + + + + 
15 + + 
16 + + 
17 + + 
18 + + 
19 + + 
20 + + + 
21 + + 
22 + + 
23 + + + 
DISORGANIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION 
Poorly Organized Sentences 
7b 
Conversational Speech Stories 
Sub~ect Control Experimental Control- Experimental 
1 .02618 .<>4215 .02112 .03788 
2 .01375 .07oo4 .02812 .07336 
3 .01599 .03788 .02853 .02952 
4 .03614 .0364<> .<>4161 .04255 
5 .02500 .02421 .05031 .<>4900 
6 .<>4369 .o6077 .05128 .08507 
7 .03lo6 .17213 .14323 .o6512 
8 .03022 .o6322 .<>4159 .o6491 
9 .03313 .o6757 .03093 .07843 
10 .03633 .03723 .03620 .o484o 
11 .02536 .10413 .05455 .o6207 
12 .07371 .o6239 .05236 .07<>47 
13 .02147 .05336 .03474 .05578 
14 .07o45 .05442 .03981 .o71o6 
15 .02342 .05992 .<>4510 .o4667 
16 .02923 .o6566 .05162 .o6839 
17 .04538 .07302 .03201 .05939 
18 .07428 .08772 .0744o .05943 
19 .02978 .o6509 .03077 .o6080 
20 .05571 .o6667 .o6556 .o6241 
21 .o4o68 .07325 .03<>41 .08085 
22 .03791 .03810 .o6083 .o6857 
23 .o64TT .05642 .07272 .09600 
125. 
D~NESS TO THE IMMmiATE SITUATION 
Present Tenses 
8a 
Conversational Speech Stories 
Sub~ect Control Experimental Control Elcperimental 
1 .14o65 .21073 .13833 .18030 
2 .14776 .19376 .16213 .19639 
3 .13960 .18633 .16239 .18735 
4 .13975 .18582 .15636 .17224 
5 .13300 .17549 .13417 .17400 
6 .15210 .15548 .13781 .16588 
7 .12411 .14751t- .13o6ll- .17836 
8 .17033 .19923 .14o98 .16443 
9 .17805 .1936~ .15361 .18627 
10 .13149 .1723 .12289 .15445 
11 .13888 .17~ .14978 .13257 
12 .15936 .17248 .16222 .16667 
13 .13238 .17111 .12488 .13868 
14 .16o47 .16553 .14649 .12643 
15 .10773 .13636 .12871 .15392 
16 .13850 .19192 .15223 .17946 
17 .14789 .16024 .13356 .16051 
18 .15818 .19298 .1576o .13566 
19 .14263 .20316 .14359 .19793 
20 .18145 .21556 .15448 .16596 
21 .14746 .18790 .17327 .18511 
22 .16272 .17857 .16667 .144o6 
23 .11932 .15759 .11909 .16500 
126. 
DIRECTEDNESS TO THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION 
Future Tenses 
8b 
Conversational Speech Stories 
SubJect Control Experimental Control Experimental 
1 .oo618 .oo766 .oo422 .00758 
2 .00802 .00298 .01031 .00226 
3 .00533 .00758 .00366 .00301 
4 .oo482 .00766 .005o4 .00815 
5 .00800 0 .01361 .00200 
6 .oo647 .00316 .009(53 .oo417 
7 .00592 0 .Oo657 .00501 
8 .oo458 0 .00710 0 
9 .oo414 .oo676 .00516 .00294 
10 .00865 .00319 .01094 .00285 
11 .009(56 .00718 .00952 0 
12 .00199 .00734 .01129 .00112 
13 .01002 .oo6414. .01523 .00710 
14 .00588 .oo455 .oo478 .00105 
15 .01171 0 .00770 .00397 
16 .01271 .00505 .00874 .00089 
17 .005o4 .01826 .ooo69 .oo642 
18 .01100 .oo439 .oo9(5o .00581 
19 .00940 .00197 .01245 .00388 
20 .OC>l43 .01111 .00376 .00567 
21 .00508 0 .o11o6 .00213 
22 .01422 .oo476 .00750 0 
23 .01136 .00973 .00727 .00300 
127. 
DIRECTEDNESS TO THE IMMD>IATE SITUATION 
Complicated Tenses 
8c 
Conversational Speech Stories 
SUbJ:ect Control:-- · Experimental Control: Experimental' 
1 .00773 .00383 .00318 0 
2 .01260 .00298 .01218 .00564 
3 .00533 0 .oo439 .oo4u 
4 .01446 .01341 .00883 0 
5 .Ol4oo .oo605 .01258 .00300 
6 .oo4o5 .00158 .00321 .00083 
7 .00147 .00820 .00376 0 
8 .00733 0 .00710 .00247 
9 .oo414 0 .oo413 .00196 
10 .00173 .00851 .01010 .00356 
11 .oo6o4 .00538 .00520 .00383 
12 .00598 .00367 .00513 .00336 
13 .00893 .00828 .00845 .00203 
14 .00196 .oo455 .00876 .01672 
15 .00234 .00826 .00770 .00099 
16 .00508 .00253 .01137 .oo625 
17 .01008 .oo609 .01095 .00241 
18 .00275 0 .0024o .00194 
19 .00782 .00395 .00879 .00259 
20 .00857 0 .01055 .00355 
21 .01695 .00955 .oo461 .00213 
22 0 0 .00250 .00385 
23 .01477 .00778 .00182 .00100 
128. 
DIREm'EDNESS TO THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION 
Interrogative Forms 
8d 
Conversational Speech Stories 
Sub~ect Control EX,perimental Control Experimental 
1 .oo461 .00383 .01795 .00758 
2 .001114. .00298 .00281 .00339 
3 .00533 .oo666 .01024 .01024 
4 .oo482 .00192 .00378 .00101 
5 .00900 .00303 .oo419 .oo4oo 
6 .01861 .00237 .00534 .00250 
7 .00147 .01639 .oo$)40 .00401 
8 .00366 0 .00710 .00164 
9 .oo621 .00225 .00309 .00294 
10 0 .01383 .00338 .00500 
11 .oo483 .00179 .00346 .00153 
12 .007CJ7 .00367 .oo616 0 
13 0 .002TI .00188 0 
14 0 .01814 .01274 .oo418 
15 .00234 .oo413 0 .00199 
16 .01652 .01010 .00787 .00179 
17 0 .oo4o6 .oo616 .00080 
18 .01651 0 .01120 .00516 
19 .00313 .00592 .00366 .00129 
20 .00286 .oo667 .00151 .00213 
21 .00508 .oo637 .01290 .oo638 
22 .00158 .02619 .00750 .00385 
23 0 .oorra .00182 .01000 
129. 
SYNCREriC MmHANISMS - SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION 
Neologisms 
9 
Conversational Speech stories 
Sub~ect Control · -Ex:peri.lllelrt;a]: Control· · Experimental 
1 0 0 .001o6 .02121 
2 .oou4 .01788 .00094 .00790 
3 0 .00152 0 .oo602 
4 0 .00192 0 .003o4 
5 .00100 .oo605 0 .00900 
6 .00081 .00710 .00107 .00250 
7 .00147 .02459 .00188 .01202 
8 .00092 .00958 .00813 .Oll50 
9 0 .oo676 .oo413 .01667 
10 0 .01809 .00505 .01423 
ll .00241 .00718 0 .oo452 
12 0 .00367 .004ll .00895 
13 0 .00918 .00377 .00913 
14 .00196 .00227 .00080 .oo627 
15 0 .oo826 .00990 .oo695 
16 .00254 .01010 .00700 .01071 
17 .00336 .01217 .00548 .01o43 
18 0 .02632 .0024o .01098 
19 .00157 .00986 .00586 .oo9o6 
20 0 .oo444 .00151 .00709 
21 0 .00318 .00092 .01277 
22 0 .00714 .00167 .00154 
23 0 0 .00091 .oo4o0 
APPENDIX C 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE ORGANIZATION 
OF SPEEG.ff SAMPLES 
lJO. 
I. Is the speech sample organized: 
A. Whatever is the topic presented, does the subject 
f'ollow this topic f'rom a beginning to an end? 
B. Does the speech sample have order, i.e., do the 
events presented f'ollow each other in some kind of' 
an order: time, similarity, space, etc? 
lJl. 
c. Does the subject answer the questions appropriatel7? 
D. Does this speech sample make sense: is it easily 
understood? Is it clear? Does it convey its 
meaning at one reading? 
II. Is the speech sample disorganized: 
A. Are there numerous irrelevancies (more than 2-3)? 
B. Are there Wlf'inished, f'ragmented topics? 
c. Is there f'luidity: easily shifting f'rom one topic 
to another, inability to complete one train of' thought, 
introduction of' new topics frequently, unnecessary 
emphasis on minor, unimportant details. 
D. Is there extreme rigidity of material: persistence 
in sticking to a topic, carrying that topic without 
shif'ting to anything else, avoidance of' questions. 
E. Are personal problems, events, f'eelings, etc., 
introduced excessivel'1, irrelevantly, when not 
asked for? 
F. Does the speech sample lack order, continuity? 
G. Is it unclear, vague: Do you have to re-read 
parts of it to understand what it is about? 
Conversational Speech was given a "+" or a "··" 
The f'ive stories were rated separately and were given a "+" or 
a "-" according to their organization. If' three stories were 
given a "+" and two were given a "- ," the total score was "+" 
for the stories. 
lJ2. 
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ABSTRACT 
This research was formulated within the framework of 
psychoanalytic theory and deals with the grammatical struc-
ture of primary-process thinking investigated in a particular 
state of weakened ego controls (alcohol intoxication). In 
line with Freud's and Rapaport's formulations on cognitive 
processes, two types of thinking are differentiated: Primary-
process thinking (ideation) and secondary-process thinking 
(thought). 
Ideation is characterized as autistic, egocentric, and 
affect-laden. It is oriented to the immediate present, and 
does not consider past experiences or future possibilities. 
It lacks spatial, temporal, and causal organization, doea 
not concern itself with the relations of time and space, and 
fails to make a definite estimation or evaluation of events 
and external reality. It is undifferentiated, diffUse, and 
vague. Since it abides by the laws of syncretic mechanisms, 
it manifests itself in symbolic forms and when expressed in 
speech, it is fragmented and disorganized. According to psy-
choanalytic theory, the primary thought processes can be ob-
served in states of weakened ego controls, such as dreams, 
psychosis or sometimes neurosis. 
It was hypothesized that these characteristics of 
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ideation are expressed in the grammatical structure of 
language. On the basis of studies carried out on the 
language behavior of psycbopatbological cases, sixteen pre-
dictions were made. It was predicted that in speech domi-
nated by the primary processes, there would be a disturbance 
in the equilibrium between diversification and repetitive-
ness (type-token ratio). First-person pronouns, indefinite 
pronouns, adjectives, subjective nouns, expletives, neo-
logisms, and the present tense would increase. Conjunction~, 
adverbs, intensifiers, interrogative for.ms, future and com-
plicated tenses would decrease. The speech sample would be 
characterized by poor grammatical structure and disorganiza-
tion. 
Alcohol intoxication was used as the means of bringing 
about the state of weakened ego controls. Speech samples 
were obtained f'rom 23 normal adult male and female subjects 
in a state of non-intoxication and in a state of intoxication. 
The speech samples were of two kinds: (1) Conversational 
Speech, consisting of a casual conversation between the sub-
ject and the examiner; and {2) Stories, consisting of reac-
tions to three TAT cards and two surrealistic pictures. Con-
versational Speech and the Stories were analyzed separately 
in terms of the sixteen predictions. 
The subjects were divided in random order into three 
groups: Speech samples were obtained from the first group of 
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subjects in a state of non-intoxication and in a state of 
intoxication. From the second group of subjects, speech 
samples in the state of non-intoxication were obtained a 
few days after the experimen~. In the third group of sub-
jects, the order of presenting the TAT cards and the pic-
tures was reversed. 
The analysis of the data showed that the speech be-
havior of these three groups of subjects changed in the ex-
pected direction with about the same average frequency, and 
therefore they were treated as one group. 
The speech samples were analyzed in terms of the six-
teen predictions and the results of the analysis showed that 
the grammatical structure of speech significantly changes in 
a state of weakened ego controls. 
Out of the 16 predictions, in Conversational Speech 
10 showed a signific~nt change under alcohol ~ntoxication 
in the predicted direction (P at .05 level or better by 
the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test): Present tenses, first-person 
pronouns, neologisms, and expletives increased. Conjunctions, 
complicated and future tenses decreased. The use of poorly 
organized sentences increased and the total speech sample 
was disorganized in its presentation. There was a tendency 
towards repetitiveness in the use of words. 
The Stories, in general, showed a change in more or 
the predictions. Out of the 16 predictions, 14 were signi-
ficant at the .05 level or better by the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test. In addition to the changes obtained in Conversa-
tional Speech, in the Stories the intensifiers, adverbs, 
and interrogative for.ms decreased and the adjectives in-
creased. 
The indefinite pronouns showed a change in the opposite 
direction. Both in Conversational Speech and the Stories, 
there was a decrease instead or an increase in their use, 
but this decrease was not signif'icant. The subjective nouns 
showed a non-significant decrease, instead of an increase in 
Conversational Speech and a non-significant increase in the 
Stories. 
The application of the Student's t to the changes in 
-
the 16 predictions by the 23 subjects showed tbat the average 
change for the entire group of subjects was highly signifi-
cant, both in Conversational Speech (~ = 8.54) and in the 
Stories (t = 9.88). 
-
No significant correlation was observed between the de-
gree of intoxication and the amount of change in the gram-
matical strncture of speech. 
The inconsistent results obtained from the adjectives 
and the failure to confir.m the predictions with regard to the 
indefinite pronouns and subjective nouns were explained first 
in ter.ms of the possibility that these characteristics of 
ideation may not be manifested in the grammatical structure 
of speech, second, in ter.ms of the limitations of the ex-
perimental method in creating severe weakening of ego controls 
required for investigating all characteristics of the pri-
marJ processes; third, in terms of the possibility that 
these grammatical forms may not be the appropriate ones for 
representing the hypothesized characteristics of ideation; 
and fourth by the suggestion that such characteristics of 
primary-process thinking could have been reflected in 
other grammatical forms. 
The better results obtained from the Stories were ex-
plained 1n ter.ms of the attitudes of the subjects, the ex-
perimental situation, and the nature of the language tasks 
required from the subjects under the two conditions - Con-
versational Speech and Stories. 
It was concluded that primary-process thinking mani-
fests itself in a different grammatical structure in speech 
when it is studied in a state of weakened ego controls. 
SUggestions for future research were made. 
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